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ABSTRACT
The impact of Delaware incorporation on firm value remains a central
question in corporate law. Despite the difficulty scholars have had in
agreeing on an answer to this question, there is a consensus that Delaware
has long enjoyed stable and important advantages in the expertise of its
judiciary and its extensive case law. These advantages are believed to be
particularly important for firms with a controlling shareholder. This Article
attempts to empirically measure the effect of Delaware incorporation on
these controlled firms and thus helps us understand the market value of
Delaware’s judiciary and caselaw. It finds, surprisingly, that controlled
Delaware firms are actually slightly less valuable than similar companies
incorporated elsewhere. This suggests that (1) Delaware does not create
much, if any, premium in market value for controlled firms or (2) “lower
quality” controlled firms—which would be less valuable regardless of where
they incorporate—disproportionately pick Delaware. Either explanation
runs counter to conventional wisdom in this literature. Finally, the results
cast new light on the long-term effects of Delaware’s recent decisions
weakening the doctrinal protection of minority shareholders embodied in
M&F Worldwide and Synutra.
I)

INTRODUCTION

One of the most controversial issues in corporate law over the last halfcentury has been how corporations’ ability to choose where to incorporate
influences the evolution of state corporate law and how that law in turn
affects firm value. In particular, much of the discussion has surrounded
Delaware’s outsized role as the incorporation choice of a majority of new
and large existing publicly traded corporations.1 Robert Daines shifted the
terms of this debate in Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? by using
empirical evidence on thousands of firms to inform what had previously been
primarily a theoretical dispute. He found that publicly-traded corporations
1. See, e.g., William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon
Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663 (1974); Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection,
and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977). For figures on Delaware
incorporation, see Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Delaware’s Competitive Reach,
9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 92, 92 (2012).
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incorporated in Delaware, controlling for a number of other factors, were
worth more money.2 Daines interpreted this to mean that Delaware’s
corporate law increased firm value, particularly as it relates to hostile
takeovers.
I extend this literature by presenting new empirical evidence on whether
the Delaware premium applies to firms for which takeover law is not
relevant: publicly traded firms with a controlling shareholder. Delaware
proponents have outlined a number of reasons why Delaware’s legal system
might create value for minority shareholders in these “controlled
corporations.” They argue that Delaware’s expert judiciary, unique political
economy, and extensive case law generate value for minority shareholders
by protecting them from exploitation by the controlling shareholder more
than other states protect their minority shareholders.3
Looking at controlled corporations therefore helps us understand the
market value, if any, of Delaware’s skilled judiciary and comprehensive case
law outside the context of board entrenchment and hostile takeovers. If these
institutional advantages have market value, it should show up here: the value
of controlled U.S. corporations is many trillions of dollars, with Facebook,
Alphabet (Google), and Berkshire Hathaway worth over $2 trillion alone.4
The control premium, which is largely a function of how well state law
polices controlling shareholders, could be as much as 10% of the value of
controlled firms on average.5 Thus, even small advantages in state law in
curbing controllers from taking private benefits should create billions of
2. See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525
(2001) (finding Delaware corporations to be worth more than comparable firms incorporated
in other states).
3. See, e.g., Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1591 (2002) (“Delaware’s body of precedent, specialized chancery court, and tradition
of interpreting fiduciary duty rules may be relatively more valuable [for firms owned by a
controlling shareholder].”).
4. Yahoo Finance, Facebook, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/FB?p=FB&.tsrc=fin-src
h [https://perma.cc/9CJ6-6HUJ] (last accessed October 28, 2020); Yahoo Finance, Google, ht
tps://finance.yahoo.com/quote/GOOG?p=GOOG&.tsrc=fin-srch [https://perma.cc/CC3V-P4
46]; Yahoo Finance, Berkshire Hathaway, https://finance.yahoo.com/quote/BRK-A?p=BRKA&.tsrc=fin-srch [https://perma.cc/8M98-L4YJ] (Note that these links will give the market
cap of each firm as of the time a person clicks on them, not as of Oct 28, 2020). As discussed
below, for data reasons, this study empirically examines 1996 to 2001, and therefore, I
generally discuss figures for that period. The market capitalization of the 380 largest
controlled corporations in the United States was $1.45 trillion in the year 2000. This was
about 15% of the total capitalization of large public firms in the U.S. at that time. See infra
Section VI. All dollar figures in this Article are nominal unless otherwise noted. $1.45 trillion
in year 2000 dollars is worth $2.2 trillion in 2020 dollars. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
CPI Inflation Calculator, https://www.bls.gov/data/inflation_calculator.htm [https://perma.cc
/CEP8-9KEP] (last visited October 26, 2020).
5. See infra Section III.
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dollars of value for minority shareholders.
Empirically studying the effect of state corporate law on the value of
minority shares is complicated by the possibility that ex-ante higher (or
lower) quality6 firms incorporate in Delaware compared with those which
decide to incorporate where their headquarters are located (their “home
state”).7 This gives rise to what economists call “endogenous variation” in
the state of incorporation of firms and makes it difficult to disentangle cause
and effect. Granted, many incorporation decisions actually seem to be driven
by factors which are only loosely associated with the firm’s quality, like
which lawyers the firm chooses.8 Nevertheless, one cannot reasonably just
assume that firms’ incorporation choices are in effect randomly assigned,
even after controlling for a variety of observable factors like firm size, age,
etc.9 This endogeneity does not mean that it is impossible to use empirical
evidence to help identify the effect of state law on the value of minority
shares, but it does require that one have a theory as to how those controlled
firms choose where to incorporate.
Based on the prior literature, there are good reasons to think that,
controlling for observable firm characteristics, ex-ante higher quality
controlled firms choose to incorporate in Delaware. Ronald Gilson, Henry
Hansmann, and Mariana Pargendler, for example, have argued that
“controlling shareholders [who] wish to use local political influence to
protect their personal interests, perhaps to the disadvantage of noncontrolling
6. To understand what I mean by “ex-ante higher quality” or “ex-ante higher value”
firms, perform the following thought experiment: imagine that all the firms actually
incorporated in Delaware had instead always incorporated at home, and calculate the value of
the firms. If—after controlling for firm-characteristics unrelated to state of incorporation—
the Delaware firms would be more valuable if they had incorporated at home than the ones
actually incorporated at home, then Delaware firms are “ex-ante higher quality.” In a formula:
E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t, DE=1] > E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t,, DE=0], where TobQi, DE=0 represents
Tobin’s Q for firm i, if it incorporates at home and “| . . . DE=1” indicates the firm chose to
incorporate in Delaware and “| . . . DE=0” indicates the firm chose to incorporate at home.
I put aside for the moment the possibility that the “treatment effect” of choosing one
jurisdiction to incorporate in varies by firm.
7. See Yair Listokin, Interpreting Empirical Estimates of the Effect of Corporate
Governance, 10 AM. L. AND ECON. REV. 90 (2008) (discussing issues that arise in empirical
studies of corporate governance).
8. See Daines, supra note 3, at 1580–82 (examining the legal market’s influence on a
firm’s choice on state of incorporation).
9. A number of papers thoughtfully challenged the findings of Does Delaware Law
Improve Firm Value? arguing that it did not convincingly control for this kind of selection of
firms into Delaware. See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence
Favor State Competition in Corporate Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1775 (2002); Lucian Arve
Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’ Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J.L. & ECON. 383
(2003). They posit that Delaware firms are different from non-Delaware firms in ways that
have nothing to do with Delaware’s legal system, even controlling for the factors Daines looks
at.
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shareholders, have an incentive to incorporate in their headquarters state,”
while controllers who are “more interested in establishing a high market
value for their shares” prefer Delaware “whose law offers (at least modestly)
greater shareholder protection and overall efficiency.”10 Likewise, critics of
Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value? have argued that the estimated
Delaware premium is too large to be causal, suggesting that ex-ante higher
quality firms choose Delaware.11
As a result, before looking at the data, one might expect controlled
Delaware firms to be worth more than their counterparts incorporated at
home both because: (1) ex-ante higher quality firms choose Delaware and
(2) Delaware’s expert judiciary and comprehensive case law increase firm
value. Observe that if, on average, ex-ante higher quality controlled firms
choose Delaware, then the Delaware premium estimated from the data
should be a ceiling on the actual effect of Delaware’s legal framework on
controlled firms.
To estimate the Delaware premium for controlled firms, I merge data
on the ownership and other characteristics of 1,500 large corporations with
a single class of common stock and a few hundred “dual-class” firms from
1996-2001.12 As explained below, using data from this period allows me to
analyze comprehensive and reliable data on all but the smallest publicly
traded U.S. firms, instead of relying on commercial databases which are
“notoriously inaccurate.”13 Of course, using older data requires additional
care in interpreting the implications for today. Still, I believe using this data
makes sense, particularly given the relatively stable nature of Delaware’s
institutional advantages (judiciary and case law) and potential
disadvantages.14
10. Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism as a
Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European
Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 512–13 (2011).
11. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 9 (arguing that if anything Daines’ results
are too high to be causal).
12. Dual-class firms usually have two classes of common stock, with both classes having
the same rights to dividends, but with one class having additional voting power. Some firms
may have more than two classes of common stock, but I employ the parlance in the literature
and call them “dual class” firms, as well.
13. Alex Edmans & Clifford G. Holderness, Blockholders: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence, in THE HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, 541, 550
(2017) (explaining the authors avoidance of readily available electronic data on firm
ownership and using a sample from 1995). See also Jennifer Dlugosz, et al., Large Blocks of
Stock: Prevalence, Size, and Measurement, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 594 (2006) (finding that using
commercial databases produced biased coefficients and unreliable results as opposed to
innocuous statistical noise).
14. On the long recognized expertise of Delaware’s judiciary, see, e.g., Curtis Alva,
Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 885, 918 (1990), (observing that practitioners found Delaware judges to be the most skilled
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Following the literature, I look at each firm’s Tobin’s Q, which
compares the market value of the firm’s assets to their book value.15 I control
for a variety of factors like firm age, size, operating profits, debt, as well as
a number of “fixed effects.”16 I find that Delaware controlled firms are worth
about 5% less than their counterparts incorporated elsewhere, after
controlling for firm characteristics. This is surprising and suggests that either
ex-ante higher quality controlled firms on average avoid Delaware or that
Delaware’s judiciary and case law have little market value for controlled
firms, or perhaps both.
I should note that although the point estimate is that Delaware
controlled firms are worth 5% less than similarly situated non-Delaware
controlled firms, the result is not precisely estimated. This is frequently the
case with estimates based on Tobin’s Q, which is a noisy outcome variable.
Thus, the data do not entirely preclude the possibility that Delaware
controlled firms are actually more valuable. But the data do rule out—using
corporate law judges); Adam O. Emmerich & Trevor S. Norwitz, For Corporate Litigation,
Delaware is Still the First State, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO:
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2018 7 (12th ed. 2018) (same), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/paper
s.cfm?abstract_id=3400258 [https://perma.cc/5NH5-TUQV].
Although Delaware law has shifted over time, scholars have long recognized the
appeal to corporations of Delaware’s responsive legislature, specialized court system, and
voluminous body of case law. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 227 (1985). A significant portion of
Delaware’s revenue comes from corporate franchise taxes, creating a strong incentive for state
legislators to keep the supposed advantages of Delaware corporate law intact. Id. at 229.
Again, these factors have not changed much over time. The main drawback of Delaware
incorporation is possibly increased litigation costs in comparison to other jurisdictions, but
this too has long been present in Delaware. See, e.g., Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler,
Race for the Bottom v. Climb to the Top: The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law,
10 J. CORP. L. 431, 459 (1985).
15. For controlled firms, the Tobin’s Q is based on the market value of minority shares
on the exchange, because the block of shares conferring control seldom trades.
16. Fixed effects allow me to limit my analysis to comparisons of similarly situated firms.
For example, by including industry fixed effects, this (in essence) ensures that the analysis
only compares firms in the same industry, but which differ as to Delaware incorporation. The
estimated Delaware effect will therefore not be driven by differences across industries in
Tobin’s Q, which just happens to correlate with differences in proportion of Delaware
incorporation across those industries.
As discussed below, if state corporate law affects firm value, many of the control
variables traditionally included in this literature—e.g., operating profits—are likely to be
affected by the firm’s choice of where to incorporate. Put differently, the primary channel
through which we might expect state corporate law to increase firm value is to raise
profitability, by, for example, reducing the controller’s tunneling of profits out of the firm.
By including controls for profitability, we will miss the effect of state corporate law on firm
value through its effect on the firm’s current profits. For this reason, I run the regressions
below both including and excluding these arguably problematic controls but find comparable
results either way.
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the 95% confidence interval—that Delaware incorporation is associated with
adding more than 1.3% to minority share value.17 Given that control
premiums attributable to private benefits frequently exceed 15% of the total
value of equity,18 this suggests that Delaware does not protect minority
shareholders substantially better than other states.
In contrast to controlled firms, all else equal, diffusely held Delaware
firms are estimated to be about 3% more valuable than similar firms
incorporated elsewhere. While the difference in the estimated Delaware
effect across the types of firms is only mildly statistically significant in some
of the specifications, the results suggest some differences in how Delaware
incorporation interacts with firm value in diffusely held and controlled firms.
I sketch two possible explanations for why we do not see a Delaware
premium for controlled firms. The first is consistent with ex-ante higher
quality controlled firms choosing Delaware, but not with Delaware creating
value for them. The second suggests instead that Delaware does create value
for controlled firms, but also that ex-ante lower quality controlled firms
choose Delaware. In this story, the negative association between Delaware
incorporation and firm value for controlled firms is caused by selection,
which hides Delaware’s actual positive effect on those firms.
In the first explanation, I suggest that, outside the realm of board
entrenchment, Delaware’s institutional advantages over other states may be
blunted by features that also increase litigation costs. Thus, Delaware does
not create value for controlled firms. Delaware’s advantages in preventing
board entrenchment may still be real, however, generating value for diffusely
owned firms. Relatedly, I hypothesize that shareholders in diffusely held
firms are actually at more risk of suffering from selective changes in
corporate law if the firm incorporates at home compared to minority owners
in controlled firms. There are numerous examples of managers of diffusely
held firms bending home-state corporate law to help entrench themselves.19
This likely reduces firm value for shareholders in diffusely held firms
17. The technically correct statement is that were we to perform this type of test 100
times, 95 times the “true” value would be below the threshold.
18. See Michael J. Barclay & Clifford G. Holderness, Private Benefits from Control of
Public Corporations, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 371, 379, 390 (1989). In 43% of the trades Barclay
and Holderness examine, the control blocks trade for more than 30% over the minority share
price. If on average the control block made up 30% of shares outstanding, then these
premiums would be about 15% of the equity value of the firm on average (based on the data
presented in Barclay and Holderness’ Figure 1). As discussed below, the “control” stakes
examined here are likely to fall into this range. Likewise, many Delaware appraisal cases
assume that minority shares trade at a 30% discount. For more on the “implicit” minority
discount in Delaware law, see Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, The Short
and Puzzling Life of the ‘Implicit Minority Discount’ in Delaware Appraisal Law, 156 U. PA.
L. REV. 1 (2007).
19. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
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incorporated at home. By contrast, I argue that controlling shareholders may
find it more challenging to warp home state corporate law to serve their
interests, because local authorities are less likely to be willing to relax the
controller’s duty of loyalty which rests on a deeply held sense of fairness.20
Taken as a whole, these theories suggest that Delaware provides little value
for controlled firms, but does increase the value for (or at least induces
selection by ex-ante higher quality) diffusely held firms.
To the extent this theory is right, it should set at ease some of the
concerns about the Delaware Supreme Court’s decisions in M&F Worldwide
(“MFW”)21 and Flood v. Synutra,22 which weakened judicial scrutiny of
conflicted transactions in controlled firms.23 As I argue below, as a doctrinal
matter during the study period, Delaware offered slightly more protection
than other states to minority shareholders. One facet of this protection was
that Delaware made it impossible for a controlling shareholder to receive the
protection of the business judgment rule in a suit challenging a conflicted
transaction.24 MFW and Synutra changed that. Delaware law now largely
insulates controllers in conflicted transactions from judicial scrutiny if the
controller has provided sufficient safeguards on the deal including
conditioning the transaction on approval by an independent board committee
and a vote by a majority of minority shareholders.
As a scholar of corporate law, I have been troubled by the potential
consequences of these decisions, but after analyzing the data in this Article,
some of my fears have been set to rest. In particular, the fact that minority
shares in Delaware firms were not more valuable than those in similar nonDelaware firms during the study period when Delaware offered greater
doctrinal protection makes me less concerned that MFW and Synutra are
likely to damage either the firm as a whole or even the interests of minority
shareholders.25
20. The intimate connection between the duty of loyalty and what we traditionally regard
as fair has not, however, protected it in all cases. Instead, Nevada has largely gotten rid of
the duty of loyalty in a bid to attract more firms. See Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation:
The Rise of Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935, 952 (2012)
(discussing Nevada’s partial repeal of the mandatory duty of loyalty).
21. Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
22. Flood v. Synutra Int’l, Inc., 195 A.3d 754 (Del. 2018).
23. See e.g., James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring
Developing Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L.
323, 348–49 (2018) (predicting that M&F Worldwide will lead to litigation migrating to other
forums and corporate controllers being less cautious in protecting minority interests); Charles
R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 10 UC IRVINE L. REV. 56,
74 (2019) (arguing that M&F Worldwide is likely to do more harm than good).
24. See infra Section IV.A.
25. This interpretation is also consistent with a direct study of M&A activity in the wake
of MFW, which found no change in the premium received by minority shareholders or the

2020] IS THERE A DELAWARE EFFECT FOR CONTROLLED FIRMS?

9

In the second explanation, I observe that if Delaware is indeed more
protective of minority interests in controlled firms, this can lead, at least in
theory, to ex-ante lower quality controlled firms choosing Delaware.
Intuitively, controlling shareholders without an existing reputation to
reassure the market that they will not exploit minority shareholders might be
more likely to choose Delaware to signal they will not tunnel assets out of
the firm. In the argot of agency theory, Delaware incorporation is thus a
form of “bonding.” The firms with controllers who need to endure these
bonding costs are likely to be ex-ante lower quality than firms whose
controller has an established and clean reputation. These latter firms may
pick Delaware less often because Delaware offers them fewer advantages,
making it more likely that idiosyncratic factors in the incorporation decision,
like which lawyers the firm hires, will predominate. If the selection effect
dominates Delaware’s creation of value for controlled firms, then we can see
a negative estimated controlled Delaware effect despite a causal effect that
runs the other way. If this theory of bonding is right, then we should still be
concerned about the potential of MFW and Synutra to damage firm value and
minority interests in the bonded firms. As discussed below, however, this
theory has real potential holes including that a controller may sometimes be
able to unilaterally reincorporate the firm in a state with less protections for
the minority, rendering the bonding illusory.
These explanations are a start but are not directly tested here and further
work is called for to understand why there does not seem to be a Delaware
premium for controlled firms.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: Section II
discusses how state corporate law affects firm value in controlled and
diffusely owned firms; Section III explains why state law’s effect on the
value of minority shares will be economically important; Section IV explains
why Delaware fiduciary law in particular might create value for controlled
firms; Section V reviews the literature on the Delaware premium; Section VI
discusses the sample and empirical methods; Section VII presents the results
and discusses explanations; Section VIII concludes.

rate of deal completion. Fernán Restrepo, Judicial Deference, Procedural Protections, and
Deal Outcomes in Freezeout Transactions: Evidence from the Effect of MFW (March 1,
2018), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3105169 [https://perma.cc/VU
W6-3EFB]. Unlike Restrepo’s study, however, the results here have implications for the full
spectrum of how Delaware regulates conflicted transactions relative to other states, including
both M&A and non-M&A issues, rather than just how MFW affected the freeze-outs which
took place after the decision was announced.
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HOW STATE CORPORATE LAW MAY CREATE (OR DESTROY)
VALUE

State corporate law is principally concerned with policing two conflicts:
those between shareholders and the management of the firm (principal-agent
problems), and those between the shareholders themselves (principalprincipal problems). In the first area, the law can create value by deterring
behavior that benefits managers but is contrary to shareholders’ interests,
while minimizing monitoring costs. 26 In the second area, the law should
provide collective decision-making mechanisms to efficiently resolve
disputes among shareholders, including preventing controlling shareholders
from exploiting minority shareholders.
While both principal-agent and principal-principal conflicts occur in all
corporations, the relative importance is very different depending on whether
the firm is diffusely owned or is controlled by a single shareholder. In
diffusely owned firms, principal-agent problems predominate; the primary
issue is how well shareholders are able to control the board. Shareholders in
these diffusely owned firms have relatively homogenous interests, making
intra-shareholder conflicts less important.27
In contrast, the interests of the controlling shareholder and the board are
tightly linked28 in controlled firms. The controlling shareholder can easily
26. The legal regime that minimizes management’s deviations from shareholders’
preferences is not necessarily optimal if it entails substantial costs to implement (i.e.
monitoring costs). There are also other ways in which these agency costs can be reduced:
highly competitive product markets will reveal managerial incompetence or lack of effort (in
the form of losses), labor contracts can be designed to align the interests of management with
shareholders, etc. See Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, HARVARD L. REV. 1161, 1196–97
(1981).
27. Shareholders’ homogeneity of interests is perhaps the best explanation for why
capital providers, and not other “patrons”, (e.g. customers, employees, etc.) own most firms
(weighting by enterprise value). See generally HENRY HANSMANN, THE OWNERSHIP OF
ENTERPRISE (1996) (discussing various forms of firm ownership).
28. Technically the board members will still owe a duty to the corporation, which can
occasionally lead to conflict between the board members and the controlling shareholder. See,
e.g., In re Gen. Growth Prop., Inc., 409 BR 43 (2009). In that case, lenders had designed a
special purpose entity to be “bankruptcy proof” by putting a director only they could elect on
the board of the firm and requiring unanimous board approval to file bankruptcy. Despite not
being organized under the DGCL, that director owed a “fiduciary duty of loyalty and care
similar to that of a director of a business corporation organized under the [DGCL].” In the
end, despite the strong objections of the lenders that elected him, that director believed he was
compelled by his fiduciary duty to vote to allow the entity to file for bankruptcy when it
became clear such filing was in the interest of the entity.
There are also issues if a firm had previously been diffusely owned but is acquired
by a controlling shareholder. Thus, for example, if Company A has put a staggered board of
a fixed size in its charter, if a shareholder acquires 51% of shares, and if the initial board
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replace the board.29 Thus, principal-agent problems are rare. In these firms,
however, the interests of the controlling shareholder frequently diverge from
those of the minority shareholders. The controlling shareholder has an
incentive to force the corporation to engage in transactions that result in
private benefits to her, while harming the minority shareholders. The
controlling shareholder might, for example, force the company to deal with
another firm she owns on terms favorable for the other firm,30 or simply
engage in a freeze-out merger with poor compensation.
Because of the different problems faced by the two kinds of
corporations, they rely on different parts of state corporate law. In diffusely
owned firms, the most important rules relate to how easily the shareholders
can remove board members by voting their shares. Intra-shareholder
disagreements are settled by majority voting for directors and on
fundamental transactions (generally with one share having one vote).
Likewise, if management is “shirking,” or otherwise acting contrary to the
shareholders’ interest, shareholders can replace them. In light of the
collective action problems that scattered shareholders face, their theoretical
right to replace management is often only relevant when there is an outside
takeover bid for the firm. State corporate law differs on how much latitude
management has to reject these offers—which threaten to strip them of their
jobs—despite shareholders’ desire to accept them. Indeed, Daines argued
Delaware’s mild anti-takeover laws, which give management less protection,
are the source of the Delaware premium he observed.31
There is some question about whether increasing shareholder control
(and thereby reducing management’s ability to act differently than
shareholders would like) is always better,32 but for the most part scholars
remains hostile, the shareholder will be unable to replace the board until a majority of the
board has come up for reelection.
29. See WILLIAM T. ALLEN, REINIER H. KRAAKMAN & GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN,
COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 154 (4th ed. 2012)
(explaining why diffuse ownership often makes it individually irrational for a shareholder to
push for beneficial changes to the board even when the total benefits outweigh the total costs).
30. In theory, the controlling shareholder will support any transaction where the side
benefit is greater than the decline in the value of the firm scaled by the percentage shares she
holds. This suggests the counterintuitive result that it is better to be a minority shareholder in
an 89% owned firm than a 51% owned firm because the controlling shareholder will come
closer to fully internalizing the costs to the firm of any deals with side-benefits. Indeed, it
suggests that from a private-benefits perspective, being a shareholder in a corporation with
multiple classes of stock — where a controlling shareholder can own more than 50% of total
votes, but less than 50% of the dividend rights — is least desirable.
31. See Daines, supra note 2, at 540–42. But see Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing
Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32, 50–51 (2004) (questioning whether Delaware law
is really any more takeover friendly than elsewhere).
32. See, e.g., Leo Strine, Can We Do Better by Ordinary Investors? A Pragmatic
Reaction to the Dueling Ideological Mythologists of Corporate Law, 114 COLUM. L. REV 449
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believe giving shareholders more control increases value.33
In controlled firms, on the other hand, any voting of shares is pro-forma,
and the controlling shareholder maintains a clear grip on the board (on which
she often sits herself). Since voting for the board cannot be relied on to solve
differences between the controlling shareholder and the minority
shareholders, state law instead polices individual transactions that benefit the
controller to the exclusion of the minority shareholders.34 These are known
as conflicted transactions or self-dealing. Ideally, the duty of loyalty would
deter all self-dealing transactions that harm the minority, while allowing
transactions that benefit the firm to go forward, even though the controller
also gets a side benefit. In reality, the law will work best if it minimizes the
sum of Type I errors (self-dealing transactions which are actually beneficial
to the minority shareholders, but are nonetheless deterred by the legal
system),35 Type II errors (self-dealing transactions that are harmful but are
allowed to go forward) and transactions costs.
Of course, the duty of loyalty is also used to deter transactions
benefiting management at the expense of shareholders in diffusely owned
corporations. The duty of loyalty, however, is less important in diffusely
owned corporations than in controlled corporations. First, in diffusely
owned firms, self-dealing transactions must generally receive the approval
of disinterested members of the board or shareholders.36 Board members
may review such transactions a bit more leniently than transactions not
involving other board members, but the disinterested board members have
(2014) (arguing that institutional shareholders have mixed motives and therefore, ordinary
investors are not necessarily better off when there is more direct shareholder control of
corporations); John Asker, Joan Farre-Mensa & Alexander Ljungqvist, Corporate Investment
and Stock Market Listing: A Puzzle? 28 REV. FIN. STUD. 342 (2014) (finding that privately
held firms invest more and are more sensitive to investment returns than apparently
comparably situated publicly listed firms, suggesting short-term myopic behavior by public
firms); Martijn Cremers, Lubomir P. Litov, & Simone M. Sepe, Staggered Boards and Firm
Value, Revisited, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 442 (2017) (finding that the adoption of a staggered board
is actually associated with increases in firm value).
33. See Lucian Bebchuk, The Myth That Insulating Boards Serves Long-Term Value, 113
COLUM. L. REV. 1637 (2013) (finding that most scholarship points toward board protection as
destructive of value even in the long run).
34. See Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971) (defining a conflicted
transaction in Delaware).
35. To see an example of Type I error, imagine that C owns 51% of Company A, which
makes widgets, and Company A could most cheaply purchase widget parts from Company B,
which C wholly owns. If, due to concerns about self-dealing, Company A must instead buy
widget parts from a different, more expensive source, this is a Type I error.
36. In nearly all states shareholders may void a conflicted transaction simply by showing
that the “benefiting” director did not obtain board approval before proceeding with the deal
(i.e. she stood directly on both sides of the deal). See WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET AL.,
FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 913. Nevada is an exception to this rule. See id.
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no direct incentive to allow bad deals to go forward. Second, even given the
collective action problems faced by shareholders, shareholders can simply
replace boards that loot the company. These constraints are not present in
controlled firms. Unchecked, self-dealing will seriously diminish the value
of minority stakes in these corporations.
Because the duty of loyalty is more important for policing conflicted
transactions in controlled firms, it seems likely that case law and courts
themselves are more important to controlled firms. This is intuitive. As
Robert Clark summarized, twisting Albert Hirschman’s aphorism,
shareholders have three rights: vote, sell, or sue.37 In a controlled
corporation, minority shareholders can only sell or sue. Without the
protections of voting, one would expect that the right to sue becomes more
important, all else equal.38
There is some empirical evidence confirming litigation plays a bigger
role in controlled firms. In a study of the Delaware Courts’ shareholder
litigation docket, Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas found that minority
shareholders being squeezed out by controlling shareholders bring a plurality
of the cases. Moreover, the authors found that “beneficial settlements are . . .
concentrated in cases where a majority shareholder is squeezing out minority
public shareholders on disadvantageous terms . . . .”39 While such results
cannot tell us about transactions (or the amount of expropriation) deterred, it
does suggest that legal remedies are more important to minority shareholders
than for shareholders in diffusely held firms.
III)

PRIVATE BENEFITS, CONTROL PREMIUMS, AND STATE
CORPORATE LAW

How well state law deters controlling shareholders from expropriating
minority shareholders is likely to be economically important. This can be
seen by observing that control shares trade at significantly higher prices than
minority shares. The price of a control block represents two valuable things:
(1) the pro-rata cash-flow rights that all shareholders receive, and (2) the
controller’s ability to take private benefits.40 Since the price of minority
37. See ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 29, at 153 (quoting Clark,
though without giving more specific attribution).
38. Indeed, the right to sell would have little value to current shareholders if the purchaser
knew he would be expropriated without any remedy, since any such purchaser would only
pay a small price.
39. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, New Look of Shareholder Litigation:
Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133, 138 (2004). Technically the study
is of the Chancery Court of New Castle County, where the vast majority of Delaware’s
corporate litigation takes place.
40. See Barclay & Holderness, supra note 18, at 373.
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shares on the exchange represents the value of pro-rata cash-flow rights, the
difference between the price of the control block and the price of shares on
the exchange can be used to compute the value of private benefits. In
particular, one should use the minority share price after the control block
changes hands, because this price will reflect the market’s expectations about
how the new controller will affect the value of cash-flow rights.41
Readers of corporate law know that the control premium is often
substantial, which means the scale of private benefits is likewise often large.
In the most famous case dealing with sale of a control block, Perlman v.
Feldmann, the control block (28% of the firm) traded for $20 per share, while
minority shares averaged $8.50 in the month before the transaction and
$10.88 in the month after the transaction.42 This premium represented 23%
of the value of the company’s equity as a whole.43 In another frequently cited
case, Zetlin v. Hanson, the control block (44% of the firm) traded for $15,
when minority shares traded at $7.35 before the transaction and $7.04 in the
month following the transaction,44 representing 50% of the total equity value
41. See Barclay & Holderness, supra note 18, at 373; See Alexander Dyck & Luigi
Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537 (2004)
(estimating private benefits of control in thirty-nine countries using controlling block sales).
In Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994), Chancellor Allen noted that perhaps
the source of the premium could also be attributed to downward sloping demand for stock
rather than private benefits. He imported this idea from an article about takeover premiums,
which focuses on firms that were not controlled prior to the takeover. See Lynn A. Stout, Are
Takeover Premiums Really Premiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99
Yale L.J. 1235 (1990).
The basic idea is that if demand for a stock is downward sloping—as opposed to
perfectly elastic as CAPM would predict—then people who own a stock value it at more than
the market price, and some much more so. Thus, if you want to buy 20% of a firm, you may
be able to buy the first 1% for close to the old market price from people who valued the stock
at roughly the market price. But by the time you buy the 20th percent, the people who are
thinking about selling believe the stock is worth substantially more than the old price.
Notably, however, Stout does not consider purchases of control blocks from a previous block
owner, and this theory does not explain control premiums in this case.
On the one hand, the would-be-purchaser would bid up the price of the stock if he
wanted to buy a big chunk of stock on the market for the reasons Stout outlines. For the same
reasons, however, the seller would have had to discount the block if he had wanted to sell the
block on the open market. In fact, in the data, we do see control blocks occasionally sold for
a discount, showing that going to the market would have yielded an even bigger discount.
Thus, the downward sloping demand for stock is a two-edged sword for block deals and
cannot easily explain the control premium.
42. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 718 n. 43 (1982) (outlining the monthly bid prices for August and September).
43. Calculated as the 28% control block times the $9.12 premium divided by the sum of
the cash flow rights or mathematically 28%*$9.12/$10.88.
44. Zetlin v. Hanson, 397 N.E.2d 387 (N.Y. 1979). Note that the opinion does not state
the date of the transaction, but it was reported in the Wall Street Journal on August 21, 1975.
Flintkote Buys 44% Gable Stake for $14.9 Million, WALL ST. J., Aug. 21, 1975, at 12.
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of the firm.45,46
In light of cases like these, and persistent expert opinions that minority
shares trade for less than control shares, Delaware courts have recognized
that minority shares trade at a significant discount. Indeed, this discount is
presumed without further evidence beyond the existence of a control stake;
as one court observed, “Delaware law recognizes that there is an inherent
minority trading discount.”47 Based on precedent, that court found a 30%
discount was typical.48 How Delaware law handles such premiums/discounts
varies “erratically in practice,”49 but there is widespread agreement in the
cases that control shares trade at a premium compared to minority stakes.50
I have cited these cases to show that the private benefits to controlling
shareholders are often large and that differences in how well state law polices
Technically, one should net out the effect of broader market factors using a market model to
arrive at the “after” transaction minority share prices, but for simplicity I just use the trading
price.
45. See also Treadway Co. v. Care Co., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that a buyer
paid a 35% premium over market price for a block of 14% of outstanding shares—5% of total
value of equity—even though the block purchased did not give clear control, but rather better
position in a proxy contest); Manacher v. Reynolds, 165 A.2d 741 (Del. Ch. 1960) (approving
a settlement in a suit alleging abuse by the controlling shareholder, where control would be
given up, but giving controlling high vote shares a 200% premium, working out to 11.8% of
the value of the company).
46. While I would like to impress on the reader that the control premiums in these cases
are big, it is worth observing that simply quoting the premium as [Pper share for control shares – P per
share for minority shares]/ P per share for minority shares, as is often done, is less clear than using the premium
as a percent of the total cash flow value of equity. For example, in Perlman v. Feldmann, 219
F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), we could say the control block sold for an 84% premium = [$20.00$10.88]/$10.88, but if the “control” premium had been equally shared by all shareholders,
minority shares would have risen 23%. A very hefty amount, no doubt, but well less than
84%.
Likewise, since the 28% control block in Feldmann appears to have been enough to
give effective control, if Feldmann had instead owned and sold 50% of the firm, he would
have sold for $15.98 per share. The per share figure is lower because the additional 22%
shares do not give any additional control benefits and hence will be worth only their cash flow
value ($10.88). Using [Pcontrol – Pminority]/ Pminority would in this case give the appearance of a
smaller premium (15.98/10.88 vs. 20.00/10.88) when in fact the value of private benefits was
the same.
47. Doft & Co. v. Travelocity.com Inc., No. CIV.A. 19734, 2004 WL 1152338, at *10
(Del. Ch. May 20, 2004) (citing Agranoff v. Miller, 791 A.2d 880, 892 (Del. Ch. 2001)). The
Doft court was referring specifically to valuing minority stakes in a freeze-out merger by
looking at the market value of minority stakes in other firms. It found that as a matter of law,
the market discounted (presumably compared to the control stake) the value of minority stakes
in the comparable firms.
48. Id.
49. John C. Coates IV, ‘Fair Value’ As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority
Discounts in Conflict Transactions, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1251, 1255 (1999).
50. See, e.g., Mendel v. Carroll, 651 A.2d 297, 305 (Del. Ch. 1994) (stating that control
shares trade at a premium).
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private benefits is likely to matter. There are two important assumptions in
this proposition that need to be examined: (1) control premiums are
influenced by state law and (2) control premiums are indeed large in many
controlled firms. Assumption One likely holds. Assumption Two probably
holds, though the empirical data are surprisingly mixed.
A. Does State Corporate Law Drive Control Premiums?
State law should and does seek to restrain private benefits that are
inefficient. Many private benefits, like the controller paying herself
excessive compensation or other methods of tunneling assets out of the firm,
may at first appear to be only a transfer from minority shareholders to the
controller. These transfers seem unfair but perhaps not inefficient. In fact,
such transfers are likely to have substantial efficiency costs as well. First,
tunneling of assets can reduce productive efficiency, as for example when
the firm buys materials from a more expensive (and less productive) supplier
because that supplier is owned by the cousin of the controller. Second, the
time and effort expended by the controller and those hired by her trying to
disguise rent seeking as ordinary activity is a dead-weight loss because those
resources could have instead been devoted to productive economic activity.
Third, minority shareholders will anticipate that the controller will tunnel
assets out of the firm and raise the cost of capital for controlled firms seeking
to raise new funds.51 This may be particularly problematic because
information asymmetries between potential investors and controllers about
the controller’s propensity and ability to take private benefits may produce
adverse selection, commonly called a “lemons problem,” raising the cost of
51. Under an optimal monitoring framework, not all the transfers extracted by the
controller which appear to come directly at the expense of the minority shareholders actually
raise the cost of capital. In this view, the controller may provide better monitoring than market
mechanisms could for the firm if it was diffusely held. The controller, however, bears
additional costs in actually monitoring the firm and in holding an under-diversified portfolio.
Thus, it can be good for minority shareholders to allow enough private benefits to induce
some shareholder to take up the “burden” of being the controller.
There are nevertheless serious objections to this theory. A number of scholars have
argued the board could be given similar incentives to monitor more cheaply or that a private
agreement could be reached with the controller if the purpose of private benefit extraction
was to reward the controller for monitoring. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf Hamdani, Corporate
Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560, 568 (2015) (describing and critiquing
the optimal monitoring view). Indeed, it is difficult to believe that the controller and the
minority owners have reached some implicit optimal arrangement when the controller retains
unilateral discretion over how many pecuniary private benefits she will attempt to extract and
given that all of these pecuniary private benefits must be taken sub silentio because they are
proscribed by state corporate law. This makes it difficult or impossible for the minority
owners to gauge whether the amount that has been extracted is consistent with the reward
necessary to induce monitoring.
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capital for controlled firms still further and giving rise to new
inefficiencies.52 For short, I call the kind of transfers described above as
“inefficient” private benefits. By credibly promising to forbid such transfers,
the law lowers the cost of capital and promotes efficiency.
In contrast, there are some private benefits that do not raise the cost of
capital, even though they will raise the value of a control block above the
price of minority shares. These are “efficient” private benefits. For example,
minority shareholders will not pay less for shares because the controller gets
the psychic satisfaction and prestige that comes with owning a firm. Nor
will outside investors pay less because of synergies that genuinely benefit
both the company in question and the controller’s other wholly owned firms.
Finally, as Zohar Goshen and Assaf Hamdani have recently argued, a
controller may be willing to pay a premium for control so that she can ensure
that her idiosyncratic vision for the firm is fulfilled.53 If there is asymmetric
information, the minority shareholders (if they trust the controller) can
benefit from this arrangement, receiving above market returns when the
controller’s business plan is realized. Not surprisingly, state law does not
attempt to restrain these kinds of private benefits.
The control premium for a firm will be equal to the sum of efficient and
inefficient private benefits. I argue below that the control premium for firms
studied here is likely to be about 10%. It matters whether this is 8%
inefficient private benefits and 2% efficient or vice-versa, because in the
former case, better state law will make a noticeable difference. Instead, if
the control premium was 8% efficient and 2% inefficient private benefits,
better state law is unlikely to change much because state law only acts to
constrain the relatively small amount of inefficient private benefits.
Globally, inefficient private benefits predominate. Control premiums
are very high in weak legal regimes and relatively small in stronger
jurisdictions.54 Since neither strong nor weak legal regimes restrain efficient
private benefits, this pattern suggests inefficient private benefits are driving
52. Controllers who know that they have a lower propensity or ability to tunnel out assets
than average—but who cannot credibly signal this—may balk at raising new capital at a cost
which reflects the average level of exploitation. The withdrawal of these higher quality firms
from the capital markets will necessitate the market raising the cost of capital for the
remaining (lower quality) firms, possibly setting off a new round of relatively higher quality
firms exiting, etc. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and
the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing the lemons problem).
53. See Goshen & Hamdani, supra note 51.
54. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 551. (2004) (estimating private benefits of control in thirty-nine
countries using controlling block sales); Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting
Rights and Control: A Cross-Country Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003) (measuring the
value of corporate voting rights, specifically of the control block of votes, in a sample of 661
dual-class firms in eighteen countries).
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the result.
Even in the U.S., inefficient private benefits still probably are the most
important. As an intuitive matter, it is difficult to believe that the
opportunities for synergies and non-harmful psychic benefits compare to the
controller’s ability to decide her compensation, manipulate transfer prices
with her wholly owned firms, and determine the payouts and timing of
squeeze-outs. This explains why the literature until the last few years has
focused almost exclusively on inefficient private benefits.55 The empirical
data also provides some support for this. As noted above, Thompson and
Thomas find settlements in Delaware Court of Chancery deemed to be
“beneficial” are concentrated in cases dealing with squeeze-outs in
controlled firms on what the authors categorize as disadvantageous terms.
This suggests that controllers believe that they can extract significant value
through squeeze-outs, despite the courts’ watchful attention to conflicted
transactions.56
Overall, it seems likely that differences in state law will substantially
affect the size of control premiums by constraining inefficient private
benefits, and that efficient private benefits, while extant, play a secondary
role. However, this is an empirical question on which more research is
needed.
B. How Big Are Control Premiums, Really?
The court cases cited above show that control premiums can be large,
but they are not a random sample of U.S. firms. Rather, control premiums
will be largest in firms where the minority shareholders are exploited, and
minority shareholders in these firms are the most likely to sue. The empirical
literature on the size of control premiums in the United States is conflicting,
with earlier studies showing much larger premiums. If the later studies are
in fact representative of U.S. firms, then control premiums are so small that
55. See Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance:
Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1664 (2006) (“The
existing literature, both analytical and empirical, focuses almost exclusively on pecuniary
benefits of control.”). What Gilson calls pecuniary private benefits are what I have called
inefficient private benefits.
56. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 39. On average, settling minority parties were
given an additional 12% compared to the initial squeeze out offer. If this is the “accurate”
average amount of money needed to give the minority their pro-rata share, and controllers are
able to slip this kind of deal past the court (or convince the minority shareholders not to
challenge) say one-third of the time, it is quite valuable. This is in essence having a permanent
option to purchase the remaining portion of the company for (in expectation) 4% less than it
is worth. Depending on the cost of financing such a purchase, this could account for a control
premium of at least couple percent. Of course, as noted below, the sample of firms which
were sued may not be representative of squeeze-outs overall.
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it will be difficult to identify the effect of differences in state law. In fact,
the later studies are very likely downwardly biased, compared to earlier
work, and both earlier and later studies represent a lower bound on the true
size of control premiums. This means that empirically, state law’s effect on
control premiums should be detectable.
Perhaps the earliest empirical study of the size of control premiums
looked at controlled banks in the Plains and Western U.S. from 1964 to 1979.
The study found that control shares traded 52% higher than minority stakes
in the same bank, which implied that this premium made up at least 26% of
the total equity value of the companies.57 In a wider ranging study, Michael
Barclay and Clifford Holderness looked at all sales involving 5% or more of
a company that were reported in the Wall Street Journal from 1978 to 1982.
They found that these blocks traded on average for 20% more than minority
shares (even after the control trade was announced), and that premium was
worth 4.3% of the total value of equity.58 Moreover, Barclay and
Holderness’ data suggest the size of the premium increases with the size of
the block. This is not surprising since acquiring 5% or 10% seldom confers
effective control, but such trades are nonetheless included in Barclay and
Holderness’ sample. Their data imply that the control premium would make
up at least 10% of the total equity value of firms even under the baseline
definition of control used in this Article, and a larger percentage for stricter
definitions of control.59
More recent work, however, finds much smaller premiums. One study
examining trades of the largest block in U.S. firms from 1979 to 1999 found
that these blocks—which represented 30% of shares outstanding on
average—traded on average for only 6.2% more than minority shares after
the deal was announced and represented only 2.4% of the total value of

57. Larry G. Meeker & O. Maurice Joy, Price Premiums for Controlling Shares of
Closely Held Bank Stock, 53 J. BUS. 297 (1980). Meeker and Joy defined control as requiring
50% or more of the equity, thus a 52% premium will make up at least 26% of the total equity
value: .52 ∙ .50 / 1 = 26%.
58. See Barclay & Holderness, supra note 18, at 379 (presenting data on premiums of
block trade).
59. On average, the controller in “controlled” firms has 33% of the firm under the
baseline definition of control used here. Looking at Barclay and Holderness, we can see that
a firm with a 33% block holder, ceteris paribus, is predicted to have 13.44% more of the total
equity value of the firm embodied in the control premium than one with a 5% block holder.
The latter firm should still have a control premium that is greater than 0. See Barclay and
Holderness, supra note 18, at 390 (Regression Column (1)). Indeed, Avner Kalay, Oǧuzhan
Karakaş & Shagun Pant, The Market Value of Corporate Votes: Theory and Evidence from
Option Prices, 69 J. FIN. 69 1235, 1238 (2014) summarizes Barclay and Holderness’s study
as showing that control was 20% of the market value of the firm, though it is not entirely clear
to me where that figure comes from.
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equity after the deal.60 Likewise, Alexander Dyck and Luigi Zingales found
that in forty-six deals in which a block of at least 10% changed hands in U.S.
companies from 1990 to 2000, the average premium as a percent of total
equity value was a mere 1%.61
Using a different technique, Luigi Zingales and later Tatiana Nenova
have backed out the value of control premiums by looking at how much more
high-vote shares trade for than low-vote (or no-vote) shares in companies
with multiple classes of stock.62 Covering 1984-1990, Zingales found about
4.3% of the total equity value of dual class firms was embedded in the
premium paid for high-vote stock, which in turn translates to a significantly
higher value of control.63 This is because the 4.3% figure represents “the
voting premium during a control contest [i.e. a measure of the value of
control] times the probability that a control contest will take place.”64 The
probability of this kind of control contest is often small, however, over a
reasonable investment horizon implying the value of control if such a contest
breaks out must be substantial. Nenova, by contrast, found a much lower
figure of 2.01% of total equity value of the firm for firms in 1997, even after
adjusting for the probability of a control contest.65
Avner Kalay, Oǧuzhan Karakaş, and Shagun Pant have cleverly
60. See Saeyoung Chang & David Mayers, Who Benefits in an Insider Negotiated Block
Trade?, 41 FIN. MGMT. 703, 707 (2012) (examining block trades in U.S. firms). Another
study found that premium per share for control shares was 9.23% on average for deals from
1978-1987, less than half of what Barclay and Holderness found. See Wayne H. Mikkelson
& Hailu Regassa, Premiums Paid in Block Transactions, 12 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
511, 513 (1991).
61. See Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Private Benefits of Control: An International
Comparison, 59 J. FIN. 537, 551. (2004) (presenting data on blocks that changed hands in
U.S. companies).
62. See Tatiana Nenova, The Value of Corporate Voting Rights and Control: A CrossCountry Analysis, 68 J. FIN. ECON. 325 (2003).
63. Luigi Zingales, What Determines the Value of Corporate Votes?, 110 Q.J. ECON.
1047, 1060 (1995). Zingales found that high vote stock traded at a 10.47% premium over
non-voting stock. Given that voting stock made up on average 43% of all shares in Zingales’
sample, this implies that approximately 4.5% of the total cash flow value of these firms was
imbedded in the voting premium
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4.5%, which in turn equals 4.3% of the total equity value of the firm including both the value
of votes and cash flow value.
64. Id. at 1061.
65. Nenova, supra note 62, at 336. The study which pioneered this method is Ronald C.
Lease, John J. McConnell, and Wayne H. Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control In
Publicly-Traded Corporations, 11 J FIN. ECON 11 439, 469 (1983). This study found that
high-vote stock in dual class firms traded at a premium of 5.4% over the low vote stock (on
average) from 1948-1978. It is not straightforward, however, to calculate how large a
percentage of the total value of the firms this premium represents.
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expanded this method to firms without a dual class structure recognizing that,
using stock options, one can create an investment position whose price tracks
the common stock, but which lacks any voting power. In other words,
investors can synthetically create non-voting stock, and the authors examine
the pricing differences between the actual common stock and the synthetic
non-voting common stock to understand the value of control from 19962007. Comparing their results to previous papers is not straightforward, but
they likely fall roughly between Zingales’ and Nenova’s.66
These studies are summarized in the table below:
TABLE 1
Summary of Studies on Size of Control Premiums in U.S. Over Time
Authors

Years Covered

Transactions

Control Premium
As a % of Total Equity
Value

Strategy: Comparing Prices of Minority Shares to Control Shares in the Same Firm
Meeker & Joy
1964-1979
37
20.6% (or more)
Barclay &
1978-1982
63
4.30%
Holderness
Chang & Mayers
1979-1999
159
2.40%
Dyck & Zingales
1990-2000
46
1%
Strategy: Comparing Prices of High Vote Stock to Low/No-Vote Stock
Zingales
1984–1990
94
> 4.31%
Nenova
1997
39
2.01%

As Table 1 shows, there is a noticeable decline in the estimated size of
control premiums over time. If these estimates are all correct, it is a stunning
result: we have successfully cut the size of private benefits in half over the
course of twenty years. This would represent a shift of more than $70 billion
as of the year 2000 in the 380 largest controlled firms alone.67
66. Kalay et al., supra note 59, at 1239, find that on average, the power to vote over the
next 38 days represents 0.16% of the value of firms. Recall that because the authors’ method
is based on stock options, it can only capture the value of voting until those options expire,
which in the case of their study was on average 38 days away. For 90 days, the authors find
the average value of votes is about 0.27% of the value of the firm. Id at 1248.
Like Zingales’ figures, however, Kalay et al.’s results represent a measure of the
value of control multiplied by the probability of a control contest (in this case within a short
period before the exercise of the options), and given that control contests within 40 days are
relatively rare, this implies a higher value of control. Exactly how much higher, however, is
unclear. To compare to previous results, for dual class firms, Kalay et al. calculate an implicit
premium between the high vote and no-vote shares of about 7% compared to 10.47% for
Zingales.
67. As of 2000, the 380 largest controlled firms (exclusive of control premiums) had a
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This phenomenon is well worth further investigation. In a follow up
paper, Gabriel Rauterberg and I intend to consistently expand both ways of
measuring premiums back in time as far as possible. This will help us
understand whether the results in Table 1 are a statistical artifact, resulting
from how the authors construct their studies, or in fact reflect something
important about real world behavior.
Regardless, even if Table 1 is not a result of how each author constructs
her sample, there are good reasons to think that Table 1 may say more about
how control is sold—or more specifically, often not sold today—than
changes in private benefit extraction. The black-letter rule announced in
casebooks is that a controller can sell her shares for a premium without any
responsibility to “share” this premium with the minority.68 As one treatise
notes, this remains good law, except where there are “special
circumstances.”69 The number of places where courts will find special
circumstances, however, appears to be expanding. This limits when (and
practically for how much) a controller can sell her stake without sharing the
premium with the minority.
Controllers have long been under a duty not to sell to those they know
(or should have known) would loot the corporation.70 More recent decisions
have put other deals under scrutiny, however. For example, the controller
cannot sell her shares for a substantial control premium where that premium
is attributable to effective control (e.g., the CEO’s post) rather than having
formal voting control.71 More importantly, at least in Delaware, the black
market capitalization of $1.45 trillion. As noted above, Barclay and Holderness’s results
imply a premium of about 10% for these corporations and cutting this estimate in half would
change the distribution of at least $70 billion.
The decline in observed premiums using these methods occurs despite the fact that
Nenova and Dyck and Zingales construct their samples in a way that should yield higher
premiums than Barclay and Holderness. Dyck and Zingales are looking only at transactions
in which 10% of company was exchanged, while Barclay and Holderness used a lower, 5%
cut-off, which should lead to higher estimates of the control premiums for Dyck and Zingales.
Likewise, Nenova’s estimate is designed to be the value of 50% ownership (i.e. full control),
which should give a higher estimate than Barclay and Holderness’ sample, where many of the
transactions will not give full control.
68. See, e.g., ALLEN, KRAAKMAN & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 29, at 420 (citing Zetlin v.
Hanson as providing the black letter rule).
69. SIMON M. LORNE & JOY MARLENE BRYAN, 11 ACQUISITIONS & MERGERS § 3:18
(2015).
70. See Insuranshares Corp. v. N. Fiscal Corp., 35 F.Supp. 22 (E.D.Pa. 1940); See also
Harris v. Carter, 582 A.2d 222, 234 (Del. Ch. 1990) (largely adopting the Insuranshares
standard).
71. Brecher v. Gregg, 392 N.Y.S.2d 776, 779 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) aff’d, 56 A.D.2d 525
(1977) (“The Court concludes as a matter of law that the agreement insofar as it provided for
a premium in exchange for a promise of control, with only 4% of the outstanding shares
actually being transferred, was contrary to public policy and illegal.”).
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letter rule is qualified where the corporation must do something to facilitate
the sale of the control stake. Frequently this means waiving the § 203
prohibition that limits actions an acquirer may take unless it gets the old
board’s consent.72 When the company must act to facilitate the sale, the
board must negotiate to improve the position of all shareholders (rather than
just the controller). In practice, this means the control premium will have to
be shared more often because the minority is given the equivalent of a partial
or full veto.
All this is a long way of saying it was probably easier to sell a control
stake at a substantial premium and keep it all in 1980 than today. This will
reduce the size of observed premiums in sales of control, even if private
benefit extraction stays the same. Where the control premium must be
shared in some way, it is harder to dislodge controllers who enjoy substantial
private benefits.73 Hence, we will tend to only see sales in companies where
the private benefits are smaller, and thus where control premiums are
smaller. Later studies like Dyck and Zingales will then be downwardly
biased compared to Barclay and Holderness, which is itself downwardly
biased.74
72. See, e.g., In re Digex Inc. Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 1176 (Del. Ch. 2000); Ronald
J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Controlling Controlling Shareholders, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 785,
805–17 (2003) (exploring the interaction of section 203 and sales by controllers).
73. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91
YALE L.J. 698, 709 (1982).
74. Barclay and Holderness acknowledge that even their study is downwardly biased for
a couple of reasons. See Barclay & Holderness, supra note 18, at 374. First, as noted above,
many of the blocks in their sample would not have yielded effective control, and their
inclusion will drive down the size of observed premiums. Second, even in 1980, controllers
who were enjoying large private benefits would still have reasonably feared that if they tried
to cash out these benefits by selling at a large premium, a court would force them to share
some or all of it with the minority. After all, Perlman v. Feldmann, where the court allowed
the minority to share in the premium (by finding sale of a corporate asset), dates to 1955.
Third, Barclay and Holderness (implicitly) assume that the seller has all the bargaining power.
See Dyck & Zingales, supra note 41, at 543. When we relax this assumption, there are two
additional ways in which the buyer’s private benefit will be underestimated by the standard
technique. The first is a buyer’s ability to retain some of the improvements to the cash flow
value of shares. The second is a buyer’s extraction of more private benefits than the seller.
These can be seen most easily in a concrete example. Let us say that Seller controls
Acme Co. and extracts private benefits worth $2 per share, while the cash flow value (and
minority share price) is $10 per share. If Buyer has an idea that will raise the cash flow value
to $11 per share and plans to extract the same level of private benefit, she will be willing to
pay $13 per share for the control stake. If Buyer and Seller have equal bargaining power, they
will transact at $12.50 (half-way between Buyer’s valuation and that of Seller). Assuming
the market can identify that Buyer has new valuable ideas, the minority price will rise to $11.
Thus, we will estimate private benefits as $1.50 per share ($12.50-$11.00), when in fact it is
$2.00. Since on average, minority share prices rise 10% after control stakes are sold, this
could be quite important. See Chang & Mayers, supra note 60, at 707. For example, if buyers
and sellers do have equal bargaining power, Chang and Mayers’ estimate of private benefits
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Nenova recognizes her method is also likely downwardly biased
because it assumes a perfectly competitive market for purchasing high vote
shares.75 More importantly, Nenova’s identification comes from dual class
firms which no longer have a controlling shareholder, i.e., where a control
stake was broken up. This happens infrequently and tends to occur when the
value of control is relatively small,76 and thus Nenova’s firms are likely to
have unusually small control premiums.
The idea that control premiums are larger in reality than those estimated
by the later studies cited above is backed up by a recent analysis by
Vyacheslav Fos and Wei Jiang.77 They have inferred control premiums from
CEOs’ decisions to exercise options during proxy fights. The authors show
that during proxy fights CEOs sometimes exercise out of the money options.
For example, in the midst of a proxy fight, Barnes and Noble’s Chairman
exercised an option requiring him to pay $16.96 to buy shares when the
market price was $14.46. CEOs in fact engaged in this kind of behavior with
some frequency from 1996-2012: in more than 10% of the proxy contests in
which they had out of the money options, they exercised some.78 This kind
of decision implies that CEOs put a significant premium on control; why else
pay $17 for something you can buy later for $14.46 unless it’s pivotal to
retaining control? Fos and Jiang use a back-of-the-envelope method to
estimate that these out of the money option exercises imply CEOs value
shares that might connote control at about 10-15% above the market price.79
In estimating the effect of Delaware law, this Article steers clear of all
of these issues because I do not rely on sales of control or looking only at a
small subset of formerly controlled firms or firms where there has been a
proxy fight and CEOs exercised out of the money options. Rather, I look at
all large publicly traded controlled firms. That said, my method has tradeoffs too: if Delaware firms are systematically different from those
incorporated elsewhere, as they probably are, that can cause problems. I
of 2.4% of equity value would rise to 4.0%.
Likewise, if Buyer plans to extract $1 more per share of private benefits than seller—
i.e., she has other ideas to increase the value of the firm, but she is planning to divert these all
to herself—then Buyer will purchase at $13, again midway between Buyer’s valuation of $14
per share and Seller’s valuation of $12 per share. Comparing this price to the minority price
($11.00 per share) will understate the true size of private benefits (here $3). All else equal,
buyers will (expect) to be able to extract more private benefits than sellers, since if they value
the cash flow portion of the stock the same, buyers must value the private benefits more than
sellers (or there could be no deal).
75. See Nenova, supra note 62, at 330.
76. See Barclay and Holderness, supra note 18, at 375–76.
77. Vyacheslav Fos & Wei Jiang, Out-of-the-money CEOs: Private Control Premium
and Option Exercises, 29 REV. FIN. STUD. 1549 (2015).
78. Id. at 1577.
79. Id. at 1581.
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discuss these issues in detail infra in Section VI.C.
To sum up, Barclay and Holderness’ estimate of a control premium
equal to 10% of total equity value for the firms studied here remains
plausible. If control premiums are 10%, substantial differences in state
corporate law will be empirically identifiable. Nevertheless, to the extent we
do not find empirical differences between states, one potential explanation is
that the later estimates are indeed representative, and control premiums have
shrunk to so small a size that differences in state law are not empirically
important.
IV)

HOW DELAWARE MAY CREATE VALUE FOR CONTROLLED
FIRMS

Doctrinally, Delaware appears to have offered slightly more protection
for minority shareholders against conflicted transactions than other states
during the study period. More importantly, Delaware has unique
institutional features which may create value for minority shareholders, even
to the extent that Delaware and other states are doctrinally similar. Thus,
there are reasons to believe that minority shareholders are better protected in
Delaware corporations and their shares should be more valuable (and less
discounted compared to the control block) than in other states.80
A. Doctrinal Differences
The primary difference in state corporate law statutes is between
Delaware and its followers during the relevant period, which are Kansas,
Oklahoma, and Nevada, and those that follow the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA). During this period, twenty-four states followed
all or substantially all of the most recent MBCA, and another seven followed
a previous incarnation.81 While in many areas the MBCA and Delaware are
very similar—indeed the MBCA often codifies Delaware case law—there
are some important differences with regard to conflicted transactions.
Delaware and the MBCA allocate legal burdens in conflicted
transactions suits differently. In Delaware, if the deal benefits a controlling
shareholder to the exclusion of the minority, the default rule is that the

80. The empirical part of this piece examines only 1996-2001 because of data limitations.
In summarizing doctrinal differences, I look at that period as well, rather than the present,
although the analysis generally carries forward to today.
81. Michael P. Dooley & Michael D. Goldman, Some Comparisons Between the Model
Business Corporation Act and the Delaware General Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 737,
738 (2001).
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defendant will bear the burden of proving entire fairness.82 During the study
period, the defendant could shift this burden by obtaining a majority of the
minority shareholders’ votes and taking various steps to simulate arm’s
length bargaining.83 In contrast, in suits for damages (rather than to enjoin a
transaction), the plaintiff in an MBCA jurisdiction always bears the burden
both of going forward and of persuasion.84 This is potentially important
because for many transactions where it is difficult to find comparable arm’s
length deal, plaintiffs may not be able to prove that the transaction is unfair,
but neither can defendants prove that it is fair. In those cases, the burden
could be dispositive (if formally applied).85
There are also differences in the effect of director approval of a
transaction. Under the MBCA, if “qualified directors” approve a transaction,
this eliminates all judicial review.86 Whether directors of a controlled
corporation could ever be “qualified” in a transaction benefiting the
controlling shareholder seems to be an open question.87 In most cases, the
directors will be disqualified by having a “relationship that would reasonably
be expected to impair the[ir] objectivity” with regard to the controlling

82. In re KKR Fin. Holdings LLC S’holder Litig., 101 A.3d 980, 989–90 (Del. Ch. 2014);
In re Wheelabrator Tech., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d 1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995). The
entire fairness standard only applies, however, if the challenged transaction provided the
controller with a special benefit that the other shareholders did not receive. See In re Synthes,
Inc. S’holder Litig., 50 A.3d 1022, 1034 (Del. Ch. 2012) (citing Sinclair Corp. v. Levein, 280
A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)).
83. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983) (“[A] showing that
the action taken was as though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining
power against the other at arm’s length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the test
of fairness.”). Additionally, the Delaware Supreme Court recently held, well after the period
studied here, that the business judgment rule applies to a conflicted controller’s offer to buy
out minority shareholders if the controller conditions the offer on the outset on both (1)
approval by a disinterested and empowered special committee, and (2) ratification by a
majority of disinterested, informed, and uncoerced shareholders. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide
Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–46 (Del. 2014).
84. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.31(b) (1) (2016) (AM. BAR ASS’N, amended 2019); see
also Dooley & Goldman, supra note 81, at 742–43 (stating that “the plaintiff has the initial
burden of going forward and retains the ultimate burdens of persuasion and proving damages”
under the MBCA). Suits for damages are important because, absent a showing of irreparable
harm which could give rise to an injunction, damages may be the only practical remedy.
85. It is of course true that although under the MBCA, the burden may technically always
be on the plaintiffs. If the circumstances surrounding the conflicted transaction are suspicious
(e.g., there is no form of minority shareholder or insulated director approval), the fact finder
may implicitly shift the burden of persuasion to the defendant.
86. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8.61–62. Such approved transactions are technically not
conflicted transactions and therefore do not constitute a valid cause of action. Id. § 8.62(a);
see also Dooley & Goldman, supra note 81, at 744 (“Approval by a majority of qualified
directors . . . fully validates the transaction and bars both equitable relief and damages[.]”).
87. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 1.43.
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shareholder,88 but under the right circumstances, the MBCA might eliminate
all liability in a controlling shareholder conflicted transaction.89 Such a result
is not possible in Delaware.90
Last, Delaware rejects using “minority discounts” in evaluating the fair
price for minority shares in a freeze-out merger. This means that minority
shareholders are supposed to receive their pro-rata share of the firm’s going
concern value, rather than only a portion of this to account for the fact that
in the open market minority shares trade at a discount to control shares.91 A
number of other states allow for such discounting, meaning that minority
shareholders will generally receive 15% or 20% less for their shares in a
freeze-out than in Delaware.92
Likely more important than these subtle differences in doctrine is how
courts handle actual cases. The literature has suggested that founders and
management may incorporate their companies in their home state in part to
get favorable treatment in local courts.93 Delaware courts appear to decide
cases with an eye on keeping companies incorporating in Delaware and
sometimes muddle the case law as result.94 However, minority shareholders
88. Id. § 1.43(b)(1).
89. For example, where the controlling shareholder has in some binding fashion agreed
not to use her power to designate some members of the board, this would seem to allow the
non-controlled directors to be qualified directors.
90. All transactions can be challenged under the “waste” exception to the business
judgment rule. See, e.g., Calma ex rel. on Behalf of Citrix Sys., Inc. v. Templeton, 114 A.3d
563, 577 (Del. Ch. 2015) (articulating the “waste” exception). More importantly, during the
study period, a conflicted transaction benefitting the controlling shareholder could not receive
business judgment protection. See In re Wheelabrator Techs., Inc. S’holders Litig., 663 A.2d
1194, 1203 (Del. Ch. 1995) (finding that in “cases arising out of transactions between the
corporation and its controlling stockholder . . . the standard of review is ordinarily entire
fairness” with ratification operating only to shift the burden of showing fairness.). But see
Kahn v. M & F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–46 (Del. 2014) (allowing business
judgment protection to properly structured freezeouts in the period after this study).
91. See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 20–21
(Del. 2017) (rejecting minority discount); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144
(Del. 1989) (same). See also Hamermesh & Wachter, supra note 18 (explaining the
difficulties with this framing of the problem of control premiums, minority discounts, and the
pro-rata share of going concern value).
92. See Coates, supra note 49, at 1353–59 (collecting case law from various states that
either rejects or allows minority discounts). As of 1999, case law in Georgia, Illinois, Indiana,
Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, New Mexico, and Ohio permitted minority discounts. Id. at
1355–58.
93. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory
Dualism as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the
European Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 513–14 (2011).
94. A good illustration of this muddling is provided by Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990), and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC
Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994), where the Delaware Supreme Court in essence
reversed itself because it became concerned that it had too fully shut down hostile takeovers.
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in Delaware companies litigating in Delaware courts will be protected from
decisions that favor a local controlling shareholder because she is an
important person in the community.95
B. Institutional Differences
Delaware’s institutional features also seem likely to add value for
minority shareholders in controlled firms for at least three reasons: (1)
quality of its judiciary; (2) its extensive case law; and (3) its implicit promise
to keep its rules up to date.
Delaware’s equity courts, while hearing other cases, have developed an
expertise in resolving business disputes. In fact, Delaware judges are widely
regarded as the most skilled state judges in the country in business matters.96
Most other states rely on a non-specialized judiciary.97 Since Delaware treats
disputes concerning corporate law as matters of equity, it does not use juries
for fact finding in corporate cases, unlike many other states.98 When
examining self-dealing transactions, Delaware’s skilled judges should, in
theory, be able to lower Type II errors (harmful transactions that are
Also, one need only think of the gradual reinterpretation of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d
858 (Del. 1985), as a duty of loyalty case, even though it is explicitly about the duty of care,
to see how the case law can become confusing in an attempt to cabin unwanted precedent.
95. Powerful controlling shareholders do not always get their way in local courts. See,
e.g., Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919) (providing a seminal illustration).
In Dodge v. Ford, Henry Ford lost that case even though he was already the preeminent figure
among Michigan businessmen. By way of example, Ford was powerful enough to
commandeer local sheriffs to do his personal bidding, in one instance commanding a sheriff
to track down a Ford manager who was on vacation in the northern part of the Michigan to
tell the manager that he had been fired as soon as Ford made that decision. See DAVID A.
HOUNSHELL, FROM THE AMERICAN SYSTEM TO MASS PRODUCTION: 1800-1932, at 290 (1984).
It should be noted that the Dodge brothers were also important local businessmen.
96. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters: History and
Agency, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 885, 918 (1990) (noting that practitioners found Delaware judges
to be expert, and quoting one stating that Delaware judges are “the most skilled judges for
corporate cases in the United States”). As an example, Delaware judges are quite well versed
in the 3-factor capital asset pricing model. See, e.g., Gesoff v. IIC Indus., Inc., 902 A.2d 1130,
1161 (Del. Ch. 2006). Searching Westlaw, the term “small stock premium”—an attribute of
the 3-factor model—shows up in 14 Delaware cases and 3 state cases in the rest of the country
combined.
97. A number of states have begun to create specialized business courts, including North
Carolina and Rhode Island, as well as various local jurisdictions. See LEE APPLEBAUM, NAT’L
CTR. FOR STATE CTS., FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2011: THE STEADY GROWTH OF
BUSINESS COURTS 70, 70–72 (2011). In light of Delaware’s first mover advantages, these new
courts seem unlikely to draw the same caliber of judges as Delaware in the near future.
98. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law,
2002 STAN. L. REV. 679, 709–12 (observing that even in states that have set up specialized
business courts, nearly all still use juries for corporate cases).
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nonetheless allowed) without increasing Type I errors (penalizing
transactions that are actually beneficial to the firm).99
Delaware also benefits from the network externalities created by
hosting so many publicly traded firms. As Michael Klausner notes,
“Delaware has accrued a large body of case law representing extensive,
nuanced learning with respect to the application of fiduciary duties and other
rules in a wide range of contexts.”100 Klausner argues that such an extensive
body of case law is a substantial advantage to Delaware corporations because
it is difficult to know ex-ante how legal rules will be applied to new
situations. Delaware firms face this situation less often precisely because
there are so many other Delaware firms. Thus, Delaware offers more legal
clarity, which is valuable to risk-averse decision makers. Obviously, this
does not mean perfect legal clarity; the muddy state of the case law and
Delaware courts’ occasional outcome driven approach guarantee some
uncertainty. But compared to many jurisdictions where there is no precedent
at all, Delaware’s cases are useful guides. For example, John Coates finds
that one third of jurisdictions have no reported cases on minority discounts
in freeze-out mergers.101 Robert Daines has argued that Delaware’s judiciary
and case law are particularly valuable for controlled firms, because fiduciary
litigation is more common for these firms.102
Last, Delaware can credibly promise that it will update its corporate law
as circumstances change in the manner that corporations want. Delaware
derives much of its revenue from corporate franchise fees — about a quarter
of Delaware’s general fund comes from them.103 Many have argued that
Delaware’s dependence on these funds ensures that it will be responsive to
changing circumstances.104 If one takes the “race to the top” view of
99. Like most civil litigation, shareholder litigation in Delaware settles the vast majority
of the time. See Thompson & Thomas, supra note 39, at 158–59 (discussing the high
settlement rates observed in various empirical studies). Because such settlements occur in the
shadow of judicial examination, however, the settlement value of a case should be influenced
by the expertise (or lack thereof) of the judiciary.
100. Michael Klausner, Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation Later, 31
J. CORP. L. 779, 793–94 (2005) (summarizing earlier work with Marcel Kahan). In addition,
practitioners are most familiar with Delaware law and as such it may serve as a common
language. Brian Broughman, Jesse M. Fried, & Darian Ibrahim, Delaware Law as Lingua
Franca: Theory and Evidence, 57 J.L. & ECON. 865 (2014).
101. Coates, supra note 49, at 1310.
102. Daines, supra note 3, at 1591.
103. William Foster, The (Limited) Allure of Delaware, 2013 ARK. L. NOTES 1476.
104. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation
Puzzle, J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 240 (1985) (analyzing the relationship between state franchise
fees and corporate law responsiveness before remarking that Delaware leads all states in both
categories); Jonathan R. Macey, & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 488–91 (1986) discussing Delaware’s
responsiveness to corporate managers and the substantial franchise tax revenues it has
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Delaware, this responsiveness can create value for shareholders.105
Similarly, if one views Delaware as the “reform” jurisdiction (and the home
state as the weak governance jurisdiction) in a “regulatory dualism”
framework, Delaware should also create value for minority shareholders.106
On the other hand, if one takes the “race to the bottom” view, Delaware may
be implicitly promising that it will continue to select rules that benefit
management at the expense of shareholders in the future.107
Despite the ambiguity of this third factor, Delaware has strong
institutional advantages in its expert judiciary and extensive case law that we
would expect to create value for controlled firms. In fact, Delaware’s
advantages in its judiciary and case law are much clearer than whether its
anti-takeover regime is genuinely more takeover-friendly than other states.108
Thus, putting aside how firms select where to incorporate, there are good
reasons to expect that minority shares in controlled Delaware corporations
should actually enjoy a greater premium than diffusely owned firms.
To summarize, in the forgoing sections, I have examined how corporate
law might create value for controlled firms, in large part by policing private
benefit extraction by controllers. I have argued that control premiums
attributable to inefficient private benefits are likely large enough that state
corporate law should matter for firm value and also explored how Delaware
in particular might have legal and institutional advantages for minority
owners in controlled firms. I turn now to the literature which has empirically
estimated the association between Delaware incorporation and firm value for
diffusely held firms, and then explain my own estimation strategy.
V)

EMPIRICAL LITERATURE ON THE DELAWARE PREMIUM

Robert Daines found that Delaware firms had “approximately 5%
greater market value” than similarly situated firms incorporated elsewhere.109
Daines came to this conclusion after examining the Tobin’s Q of Delaware
garnered as a result).
105. See Ralph K. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the
Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251 (1977) (espousing the “race to the top” view).
106. See Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 93, at 512–18 (discussing regulatory
dualism); Marcel Kahan, & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law,
2002 STAN. L. REV. 679, 686, 739–41 (arguing that Delaware provides more protection to
shareholders than non-competing states).
107. See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware,
83 Yale L.J. 663 (1974) (espousing the “race to the bottom” perspective).
108. See Subramanian, supra note 31 (questioning whether Delaware law is more takeover
friendly than elsewhere). Given the effectiveness of poison pills combined with staggered
boards—which are both legal in Delaware—it is unclear if the boards of Delaware firms are
actually much more vulnerable to takeovers than elsewhere.
109. Daines, supra note 2, at 533.
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and non-Delaware firms, controlling for a number of firm characteristics.
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of assets to the replacement value
of those assets, with the replacement value proxied by book value. Tobin’s
Q greater than one suggests the firm is adding value and has positive netpresent-value projects to invest in.
Daines’ sample contained all exchange traded firms in the Compustat
database (which is the vast majority of firms that trade on U.S. exchanges),
excluding banks and regulated utilities, from 1979-1996.110 He controlled
for return on assets (ROA),111 research and development expenditures (R&D)
as a proxy for investment opportunities, and the log of the value of sales as
proxy for firm size. He also trimmed his sample by dropping the top and
bottom 1% of Tobin’s Q results to minimize the impact of outliers. Daines’
baseline result is that Delaware firms have a Tobin’s Q that is .07 higher than
non-Delaware firms, which implies about a 5% higher market valuation. (It
is less than 7% because the average Tobin’s Q is greater than one). As
discussed above, Daines attributed this premium to Delaware’s relatively
mild anti-takeover provisions.
The most obvious reaction to Daines’ work is that there may be an
omitted variable problem: does Delaware create higher value firms, or do
higher value firms simply pick Delaware to incorporate in? Anticipating this
kind of criticism, Daines notes that “whatever factors determine the domicile
of the firms at the IPO, it is unlikely that these factors continue to be highly
correlated with firm value . . . decades later.”112 Daines finds that mature
firms still exhibit a Delaware premium and concludes that the premium is
thus not driven simply by more valuable firms picking Delaware initially.
This is not entirely convincing: corporate governance structures are often
long lasting. Similarly, there may be differential survivorship.113
110. Each firm appears in Daines’ sample once per year of its existence. Daines excludes
banks and utilities “due to significant federal regulation and because rules governing the
takeovers of such firms are determined by the state in which they operate,” not where they are
incorporated. Daines, supra note 2, at 530.
111. ROA = Operating incomet/Assets t-1. As discussed above supra note 16, Daines and
subsequent work which uses ROA are “over-including” when looking at the Delaware effect.
For example, if Delaware law does a better job of deterring harmful conflicted transactions,
this will show up in the ROA. If one controls for ROA, then the results will not pick up
Delaware’s effect on Tobin’s Q through increasing return on assets. I do include ROA, but
my results are similar if I exclude ROA, suggesting that in fact ROA is not highly correlated
with Delaware incorporation, controlling for other firm-level characteristics.
112. Daines, supra note 2, at 550.
113. For example, it is quite plausible that Delaware firms were more likely to use stock
option compensation during the 1980s and 1990s, which makes executives more likely to be
willing to accept takeover offers. Thus, low performers among Delaware firms might be more
likely to exit via takeover. This would leave “mature” Delaware firms as on average better
performers than in other states, even if Delaware’s legal regime did not add value.
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In two papers Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen highlighted the
possible selection issues in Daines’ model. They observe that Daines’
estimates of the Delaware effect bounce around quite a bit year-by-year in a
way that is not related to changes in Delaware law and instead suggest shared
unobserved characteristics. They suggest instead that more ambitious or
talented managers chose Delaware (or more likely choose lawyers who chose
Delaware).
Daines’ results were reworked in depth by Guhan Subramanian.114 He
finds that the Delaware effect declines from 1990-1996, and extending the
sample, the effect disappears altogether from 1997-2002. Subramanian also
finds that the effect is concentrated at the smaller end of the firms, such that
Daines’ estimate of the economic impact is too large. He also has some
valuable econometric criticisms of Daines’ method.115 Subramanian
suggests that changes in Delaware’s takeover laws may have caused the
disappearance of the Delaware premium.
Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick also examine Daines’
findings as part of their examination of 1,500 large firms to see how firm
governance impacts stock returns.116 Gompers et al. look at firms who are
covered by the Investment Responsibility Research Center to construct an
index of firm governance provisions (the “G” index). This index is simply
the sum of twenty-four governance characteristics where a one is given for
anti-shareholders’ rights provisions (a classified board, limited ability to call
a special shareholders meeting, state law and charter takeover protections,
etc.). Gompers et al. find that the G index is associated with Tobin’s Q and
after including it the Delaware premium is no longer statistically significant.
In later work, Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell find that only six of these factors
have a consistent association with firm value, which they combine to create
the Entrenchment “E index”.117
None of these studies have separated out controlled firms. They focus
on takeover protection and governance provisions which are relevant
primarily for diffusely held corporations. Looking at controlled corporations
helps us to see whether Delaware’s expert judiciary and extensive case law
generate market value outside the takeover realm. In particular, if we do not
find that minority shares in controlled Delaware firms are more valuable than
114. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 32
(2004).
115. Among other things, Subramanian correctly observes that Daines’ baseline model
likely has autocorrelation problems, and his standard errors are thus underestimated.
116. Paul A. Gompers, Joy L. Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON 107 (2003) (It should be noted that the authors only discuss the
disappearance of the Delaware premium in the working paper version).
117. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate
Governance?, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 783 (2008).
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their non-Delaware counterparts, this would suggest that the institutional
factors noted in Section IV do not create substantial share value. It might
also imply that ex-ante lower quality controlled firms choose Delaware. If
we do find controlled Delaware firms are more valuable, this is consistent
with either Delaware creating value or ex-ante higher quality controlled
firms choosing Delaware.
VI)

EMPIRICAL STRATEGY AND DATA

A. Strategy
I start by calculating Tobin’s Q for controlled and non-controlled firms
incorporated in Delaware and in other states, as well as the firm-level
controls used in Daines and the subsequent papers discussed above, as well
as a control for firm age. More formally, I estimate the following equation,
where i denotes a firm, and t denotes a year:
Qi,t = βDE∙DE + βcontrol∙Control + βcontrol∙DE∙DE∙Control + Β∙Χi,t + εi,t
Qi,t is Tobin’s Q for firm i in year t.118 It is important to note this is not
the true Tobin’s Q for controlled firms because I calculate the market value
of equity using the trading price of minority shares. Therefore, my estimate
will tell us whether it is more valuable to own 1% of a controlled firm with
the same book value of assets (and other firm characteristics) if the firm is
incorporated in Delaware than elsewhere. Thus, this measure really gets at
whether Delaware protects minority shareholders better, rather than if it adds
total value to controlled corporations. However, since state law only affects
inefficient private benefits, if Delaware minority stakes are more valuable,
that suggests Delaware is creating value overall.
DE is a dummy variable equal to one if a firm is incorporated in
Delaware and βDE is the Delaware premium/penalty for non-controlled firms.
Control is a dummy variable equal to one if the firm is “controlled.” I define
a controlled firm as having more than 35% of its shares owned by any
insiders, or a single insider with more than 15% ownership, or a single
outsider with more than 25% ownership.119 βcontrol is the penalty for being a
118. I also “winsorize” Tobin’s Q at the top and bottom 5% of the sample to reduce the
impact of extreme outliers. This means that I replace the highest 5% of Tobin’s Q data with
a value that would put the firm in the 95th percentile (and the same with the lowest 5% and
the 5th percentile). Thus, I replace all Tobin’s Q values above 5.71 with 5.71 and all values
below .91 with .91. This is a common way to deal with outliers. The results are not
qualitatively different with a different cutoff, though when I winsorize less of the sample, the
results are noisier. Below, I also present the results of quantile regressions which are more
robust to outliers than regression using ordinary least squares (OLS). For these regressions, I
do not winsorize Tobin’s Q.
119. In the Appendix, I show results using a stricter definition of control, though the results
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minority shareholder outside Delaware. Β∙Χi,t is a set of firm level controls
for: 1) operating income; 2) R&D; 3) debt, each normalized by value of
sales;120 4) the “E index” to control for firm governance; 5) a control for the
size of the firm;121 6) year dummies to control for market wide trends in
Tobin’s Q; 7) dummies for each three digit SIC code to control for industry
level differences in Tobin’s Q; and 8) a control for the age of the firm.122
βcontrol∙DE measures whether the difference between controlled and noncontrolled firms is bigger or smaller in Delaware than elsewhere.123 Our
variables of interest are [βcontrol∙DE + βDE] and βcontrol∙DE itself. If βcontrol∙DE + βDE
≤ 0, subject to the assumptions below, this indicates that Delaware is not
creating value for controlled firms since minority stakes in controlled
Delaware firms are worth less than in similarly situated firms incorporated
elsewhere.124 If βcontrol∙DE ≠ 0, we would have some evidence that the
Delaware effect is not just selection, or at a minimum, that selection is
operating differently across controlled and diffusely held firms.
B. Identifying Assumptions
After adjusting for the control variables (Β∙Χi,t), if controlled firms that
choose Delaware are highly similar to those that incorporate in their home
state, then βcontrol∙DE + βDE will be an accurate estimate of the effect of
Delaware law on controlled firms.125 Put differently, this assumption means
are quite similar. As discussed below, for dual-class firms, I only have data on aggregate
insider ownership rather than on an individual-by-individual basis. Thus, for these firms I
determine control only by reference to aggregate insider ownership. The results are
comparable if I define control based only on aggregate insider ownership across all firms.
120. Using sales to normalize these variables differs from Daines and Subramanian who
use book value of assets to normalize these variables. Doing so seems to unnecessarily
introduce the potential for simultaneity bias, because book value of assets is on both sides of
the equation (in the denominator of Tobin’s Q as well as the denominator of the control
variables). Regardless, my results are generally similar if I use book value of assets to
normalize instead.
121. I divide the firms into 10 deciles based on sale and then include dummies for each
decile. This allows for a flexible quasi-nonparametric control for the impact of firm size on
Tobin’s Q.
122. As with firm size, I divide the firms into 10 groups based on age and then include
dummies for each group.
123. Mathematically [DEcontrol – DEnon-control] – [Other Statescontrol – Other Statesnon-control] =
[βDE + βcontrol + βcontrol*DE - βDE] – [βcontrol – 0 ] = βcontrol*DE.
124. This result would also be consistent with lower value controlled firms selecting
Delaware.
125. Formally, this assumption holds if E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t, DE=1] = E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t,,
DE=0], where TobQi, DE=0 represents Tobin’s Q for firm i, if it incorporates at home. In other
words, imagine that all the firms that are actually incorporated in Delaware reincorporate in
their home state. If the assumption holds, the former Delaware firms should have identical
Tobin’s Q to the firms initially incorporated at home. See also Listokin, supra note 7.
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that the decision of whether to incorporate in Delaware or at home is
essentially random after adjusting for Β∙Χi,t.
There is in fact a lot of randomness in a company’s decision of where
to incorporate because it depends in large part on which law firm the
company hires when it is completing its IPO.126 If the company hires a local
law firm, it is more likely to end up incorporating in its home state, but if it
hires a national firm, it will likely end up incorporating in Delaware. The
decision of which kind of law firm to hire, however, appears to be highly
idiosyncratic and companies tend to stay wherever they incorporated at the
time of their IPO.127
Nevertheless, it is unrealistic to think that incorporation is as good as
randomly assigned. As Table 2 below shows, there are some differences in
the observable characteristics of Delaware and non-Delaware firms, which
suggests that there are probably some consistent unobserved differences as
well. There are at least two possible sources of differences between
Delaware and non-Delaware firms. First, there is probably some correlation
between management characteristics and what kinds of lawyers they choose,
and these management characteristics in turn affect Tobin’s Q. For example,
one might think that more talented or ambitious managers are more likely to
be comfortable with counsel from a national law firm and these managers
also increase the Tobin’s Q of their firm.128 This would lead to ex-ante higher
value firms choosing Delaware and a positive association between Delaware
and Tobin’s Q regardless of the quality of the legal regime.
Second, entrepreneurs and managers do actually think directly about
whether it fits their aims to leave their home state and incorporate in
Delaware.129 Scholars have framed this choice as embodying “regulatory
dualism” with the decision turning on whether founders and managers prize
maintaining local influence (in which case they stay home in a weak
governance jurisdiction) or increasing share value (in which case they
incorporate in Delaware, the reformed, strong governance jurisdiction).130
Staying home allows a company to throw its weight around the local
126. See Daines, supra note 3, at 1580–82 (explaining how law firms can impact
incorporation process).
127. See Daines, supra note 3, at 1580–82.
128. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 9, at 1789–90 (putting this hypothesis
forward).
129. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 274 (1985) (finding that while lawyers play the main part in
reincorporations, management was still the first to suggest reincorporating in 30% of the
companies surveyed).
130. See Ronald J. Gilson, Henry Hansmann & Mariana Pargendler, Regulatory Dualism
as a Development Strategy: Corporate Reform in Brazil, the United States, and the European
Union, 63 STAN. L. REV. 475, 512–18 (2011); Daines, supra note 3, at 1578.
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legislature to influence the corporate law in its state. In numerous cases,
large locally incorporated companies have pushed through legal changes to
protect their management from takeovers.131 As discussed above, local
courts may also be more favorable to large local companies and litigation is
probably more likely to be in local courts if the company incorporates at
home. On the other hand, to the extent that this kind of home court advantage
comes at the expense of minority shareholders, would-be minority owners
should be less willing to buy shares in firms incorporating at home (rather
than in Delaware). This in turn will restrain founders from always
incorporating at home.
Regardless, as Gilson, Hansmann, and Pargendler have argued, this
kind of regulatory dualism seems likely to result in higher quality firms
incorporating in Delaware. As suggested above, where the company
incorporates depends on what the founders/mangers prioritize: maintaining
the flexibility to influence local corporate law if a situation arises when that
would be useful or maximizing share price. Management that prefers the
latter seems very likely to be of higher quality on average. Empirically,
Daines’ results also provide partial support for this idea among diffusely
owned firms. His Delaware effect is on the high side for what we could
reasonably expect corporate law to contribute to firm value, suggesting that
if anything, higher quality firms choose Delaware.132
Therefore, it is likely that controlled Delaware firms are ex-ante higher
quality and should be worth more, ignoring the effects of legal regimes.133
This means that βcontrol∙DE + βDE will be a ceiling on the causal impact of
Delaware law for controlled firms since it embeds both the causal effect of
Delaware and the (likely) fact that Delaware firms are higher quality
regardless of legal regime.
If selection works similarly across controlled and diffusely held

131. Three well publicized examples are: (1) Greyhound sought and obtained protective
legislation in Arizona to defeat a takeover bid, in which a legislator complained that
“Greyhound said ‘Jump’ and we said, ‘how high;’” (2) Aetna pushed through protective
legislation in Connecticut; (3) a prominent Massachusetts company facing a hostile takeover
bid convinced the legislature to classify the board of all Massachusetts companies overnight.
See MARK J. ROE, TAKEOVER POLITICS, IN THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOVERS AND
LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321, 339 (Margaret M. Blair ed.,
(1993)) (providing examples of local companies pushing state legislators to change state
corporate takeover law); Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 130, at 517; Roberta
Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG.
225 (1985).
132. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 9 (arguing that if anything, Daines’ results
are too high to be causal).
133. Formally E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t, DE=1 Control = 1] > E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t,, DE=0
Control = 1].

2020] IS THERE A DELAWARE EFFECT FOR CONTROLLED FIRMS?

37

firms,134 βcontrol∙DE will be an unbiased estimate of the differential effect of
Delaware law on controlled firms as compared to diffusely held firms. Even
if Delaware law is good for controlled firms, βcontrol∙DE can be less than zero
in this situation. That is because if Delaware law is sufficiently good for
diffusely held firms, then overall it can increase minority share values in
controlled firms, even if it does so by less than for diffusely held firms.
If selection does not operate similarly across controlled and diffusely
held firms, then βcontrol∙DE could represent either a floor or a ceiling on the
differential effect, depending on the nature of the selection mechanism.
βcontrol∙DE will be a ceiling if the phenomenon of higher quality firms picking
Delaware is stronger among controlled firms, and a floor if that phenomenon
is stronger among diffusely owned firms. The regulatory dualism framework
would seem to predict that sorting would be stronger among controlled firms
than diffusely held firms. In that case, βcontrol∙DE will be a ceiling. In countries
that weakly police private benefits (e.g., Brazil), it is clear that controlled
firms have the more to gain by choosing to be governed by the reform regime
and thereby credibly binding themselves to less exploitation of minority
shareholders. Thus, failing to opt into the reform regime tells us more about
the objectives of management of the controlled firms than diffusely held
firms that do not opt into the reform jurisdiction. The logic can be applied
to the U.S. However, it is not entirely clear this is correct, since it is plausible
that Delaware’s value as a reform jurisdiction might be greater in terms of
its relatively mild anti-takeover laws than for checking self-dealing in
controlled firms.135
C. Data
The most reliable data on ownership of control stakes comes from
Gompers, Metrick, and two coauthors who manually cleaned the proxies of
1500 large firms from 1996 to 2001. They showed that the commercial
databases were not reliable to use for aggregate ownership because of issues
with double counting.136 Like many of the recent studies involving block
134. Formally, E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t, DE=1 Control = 1] - E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t, DE=0
Control = 1] = E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t,, DE=1 Control = 0] - E[TobQi, DE=0 | Β∙Χi,t,, DE=0 Control
= 0].
135. At first blush, the data appears to suggest controlled firms prize Delaware more. A
statistically significantly greater percent of controlled firms opt into Delaware than among
diffusely held firms. But as it turns out this is just a cohort effect. On average, controlled
firms are younger, and younger firms are more likely to have chosen Delaware. After
controlling for firm age, controlled firms are not statistically significantly more likely to
choose Delaware.
136. Jennifer Dlugosz, et al., Large Blocks of Stock: Prevalence, Size, and
Measurement, 12 J. CORP. FIN. 594 (2006).
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ownership,137 I use this database. I supplement this data using Gompers,
Metrick, and Ishii’s data on firms with multiple classes of stock outstanding
over the same period.138 Most of these firms are controlled firms.
I also obtain data on the E index from Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell’s
work.139 All other data was obtained from Compustat. Following Daines
and Subramanian, I also drop banks and regulated utilities. R&D
expenditures are missing for roughly one third of firms. I do not drop the
firms with missing data, but rather replace missing observations with zeros,
and then include a dummy variable indicating which firms had missing data.
This is a common method to deal with incomplete data.140
TABLE 2
All Firms
Mean
Std Dev
# Firm
Years

7391

Tobin's Q
G Index
Debt/Sales
1
Mark-Up
R&D/Sales
2
Size Decile
3

Age Decile

Table 2
Summary Statistics

DE, Diffuse
Not DE, Diffuse
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev

3372

2328

DE, Contr'ld
Not DE, Contr'ld
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev

1159

532

2.05
9.26
0.53

1.22
2.83
9.18

2.16
9.17
0.40

1.30
2.86
1.41

1.98
9.76
0.26

1.15
2.62
0.61

1.96
6.87
1.48

1.18
2.46
23.03

1.85
7.94
0.45

1.06
3.05
0.80

-0.14
0.21

8.07
4.03

-0.07
0.20

3.65
2.11

-0.14
0.27

8.21
6.37

-0.43
0.11

15.53
1.29

0.09
0.05

0.13
0.13

5.51

2.87

5.75

2.94

5.83

2.82

4.72

2.73

4.26

2.31

5.50

2.90

5.42

2.87

6.23

2.59

3.98

2.94

4.64

2.82

1

Operating income/Sales. This distribution is heavily left skewed by firms that have large losses and small sales.

2

Firms are divided into 10 equal sized groups in each year based on their sales. 1 is the smallest, 10 is the
largest group.

3

Firms are divided into 10 equal sized groups based on how long they have been publicly traded. 1 is the
newest firms, 10 is the oldest firms.

Tobin’s Q is slightly larger here than in Daines’ sample (2.05 here, 1.7
in Daines), but this makes sense because the sample here is composed of the

137. See, e.g., Paul Brockman & Xuemin Sterling Yan, Block Ownership and FirmSpecific Information, 33 J. BANKING & FIN. 308 (2009) (using the Dlugosz et al. data);
Sreedhar T. Bharath, Sudarshan Jayaraman, & Venky Nagar, Exit as Governance: An
Empirical Analysis, 68 J. FIN. 2515 (2013) (same).
138. Paul Gompers, Andrew Metrick & Joy Ishii, Extreme Governance: An Analysis of
Dual-Class Firms in The United States, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 1051 (2010).
139. See Bebchuk, Cohen & Ferrell, supra note 117.
140. Simply including a dummy for missing R&D, while common, is not entirely
unproblematic and under some conditions, can lead to biased coefficients, but the results are
comparable excluding R&D (and likewise for the E-Index whose missing observations I
handle similarly).
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highest market-value firms. Since market-value is the numerator of Tobin’s
Q, it is not surprising that more valuable firms on average have a higher
Tobin’s Q, even after dividing by book value.141 Without controlling for firm
level characteristics, Delaware firms have a higher Tobin’s Q both among
controlled firms and non-controlled firms. Dispersed ownership firms are
slightly larger in terms of sales. Delaware firms are younger on average,
which is in keeping with Delaware’s increasing share of the IPO market.142
VII)

RESULTS

TABLE 3
Impact of DE Incorporation on Controlled and Non-Controlled Firms
1996-2001
Outcome: Tobin's Q
DE firm

Ordinary Least
Squares†
0.0528

(0.0423)

Median
Regression†
0.0512

(0.0394)

Cntrld Firm

-0.0009
(0.0797)

(0.0516)

Cntrld DE Firm

-0.1480

-0.1226

E index

-0.0850

-0.0593

Scaled-Debt

0.0078

Mark-Up
Scaled-R&D

(0.0838)*
(0.0184)***
(0.0025)***

0.0161

(0.0040)***

0.0378

0.0036

(0.0567)**

(0.0128)***

0.0073

(0.0016)***

0.0141

(0.0028)***

0.0488

(0.0094)***

(0.0035)***

R&D Missing

-0.1460

-0.0680

E Index Missing

-0.3926

-0.2429

R2
N

0.37
7,271

0.17
7,271

(0.0357)***
(0.0400)***

(0.0295)**
(0.0396)***

* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01
Fixed effects controlling for firm size, industry (three digit SIC code), age, and market-wide year effects included in
the model, but not reported.
†

Standard errors clustered at the state of incorporation level. Clustering at the firm level yields almost identical results.

141. P/E ratios were also higher during this period than Daines’, again making it not
surprising that Tobin’s Q is higher here.
142. See Daines, supra note 3, at 1591–92 (noting that Delaware’s share of the IPO market
increased from 40% to 70%).
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My estimate of the Delaware effect is similar to Daines’ and the
estimated effect is still economically meaningful: diffusely held Delaware
firms are worth approximately $80 million more for a middle-sized firm. But
the effect is not distinguishable from zero, because it is not precisely
estimated. Indeed, because my sample is for fewer firms and fewer years, I
have less power than Daines and my standard errors are calculated in a more
conservative fashion. Thus, while I estimate a coefficient that is similar, it
is not statistically significant.
Despite the arguments put forward in Section IV, the impact of
Delaware incorporation on controlled firms is estimated to actually be
negative. Controlled Delaware firms have a lower Tobin’s Q compared to
controlled firms incorporated elsewhere, after factoring in firm
characteristics. The point estimate is that controlled Delaware firms are on
average worth 4.9% less than similarly situated firms incorporated
elsewhere.143 Using the 95% confidence interval, it is possible to rule out
that Delaware is associated with adding more than 1.3% on average to
minority share values (or 1.4% for minority shares in the (conditional)
median controlled firm).144 Again, in light of the size of private benefits and
control premiums, this is useful information since it is easy to imagine that a
much more efficient legal system could add more than 1.3% to minority
share prices.
In addition, as shown in the Appendix, the results in Table 3 are not
artifacts of controlling for arguably problematic variables, like operating
profits, which might be a channel through which state corporate law effects
value.145 Instead, if those variables most likely to be affected by state law
are excluded, the estimates are similar.146
Finally, I also re-run my results using “Total Q” instead of the
143. “Median regression” provides an estimate of the effect associated with Delaware
incorporation on the median controlled firm—adjusting for firm characteristics—rather than
the average controlled firm as in OLS. The estimates in Table 3 indicate that, after controlling
for other firm characteristics, Delaware incorporation is associated with a 3.8% drop in the
value of the median controlled firm.
144. Note this is a one-sided test designed to find the upper bound such that if we repeated
such a test with different data, the true value would fall below this line 95% of the time. The
two-sided equivalent runs from -12.5% to 2.8%. For the conditional median, the two-sided
95% confidence interval of the Delaware effect for controlled firms is -9.4% to 2.2%.
145. See discussion supra note 16.
146. As discussed supra in note 30, one might be concerned that the value of minority
shares depends on the percentage of the company held by the controller. If the controller has
a lower stake, she is theoretically more likely to exploit the minority, leading to lower minority
share prices. This in turn would affect the calculated Tobin’s Q. But I find that the results
are quite similar if I address this concern by using a series of dummy control variables
indicating the percentage of the firm’s votes controlled by insiders (rounded to the nearest
10%).
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traditional calculation of Tobin’s Q based on book value.147 Total Q is
designed to adjust for each firm’s spending on intangible forms of capital
like worker-training, advertising, R&D, etc. This kind of spending usually
does not increase book value under the accounting rules, even though
conceptually it should do so.148 As shown in the Appendix, the results using
“Total Q” are again quite similar, if a bit larger in magnitude for each
variable of interest.
A. Explaining the Main Result
There are at least four possible explanations for why βcontrol∙DE + βDE is
estimated to be less than zero and with a 95% upper bound not much above
zero.
1. Delaware’s legal regime is actually worse or not materially better
for controlled firms.
The simplest causal explanation is that Delaware corporate law simply
is not better for controlled firms. The controlled firms that choose Delaware
are of the same or higher quality than those elsewhere, but the data correctly
reveal that Delaware’s law is not better.
It is worth revisiting Delaware’s supposed advantages. The high quality
of Delaware’s judiciary is unquestioned. Its voluminous case law is also
probably valuable for generating predictability, and its doctrine is slightly
more protective of minority shareholders than other jurisdictions. These
advantages come at a cost, however. Delaware charges higher franchise fees,
and more importantly, its attorney’s fees rules may incentivize more
shareholder’s suits than other states149 and make it harder to get these suits
dismissed before summary judgment.
If Delaware law really is not better for controlled firms, then there are
a couple explanations for why diffusely held firms appear to be differently
affected by Delaware incorporation.150 First, and most importantly,
Delaware may retain a real and significant advantage through its milder antitakeover laws. Controlled firms are unaffected by these laws. Second,
147. See Ryan H. Peters & Lucian A. Taylor, Intangible Capital and the Investment-Q
Relation, 123 J. FIN. ECON. 251, 252 (2017).
148. See Id. at 256.
149. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 491–96 (1987).
150. Note that the results are not precise enough to ensure with a high degree of confidence
that there is a different Delaware effect associated with diffusely held and controlled firms.
They suggest there is a difference, but the result is only statistically significant in the median
regression and there at the 6% level.
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controlled firms are more likely to be involved in fiduciary litigation and so
may bear proportionally more costs if Delaware’s rules increase the
likelihood and cost of litigation.
Third, shareholders in diffusely held firms may bear a relatively higher
cost from incorporating at home than in controlled firms along another
dimension: the risk of selective, adverse, changes in corporate law.
Managers generally want changes to the corporate law to protect their jobs,
and there are numerous examples of them succeeding.151 In these endeavors,
management can often enlist the help of labor and employees who stand to
lose if new management arrives. Controlling shareholders of course do not
need the legislature’s help in these matters. Instead, controllers will be
concerned primarily with the regulation of conflicted transactions. It may be
harder to get legislators to bend these rules, however. Controlling
shareholders have fewer natural allies and existing fiduciary rules are more
closely tied to our societal sense of fairness than for example, whether a
board is classified. Hence, legislators and courts are likely less willing to
change fiduciary rules.152 Indeed, it is also possible controlled firms get more
benefits out of home state incorporation, as well as arguably bearing fewer
costs in the form of selective law changes.153
These explanations will interact with how firms decide where to
incorporate. If these hypotheses are correct and Delaware law is not better
for controlled firms, but is for diffusely held firms, then under the regulatory
dualism approach suggested by Gilson, Hansmann, and Pargendler,
Delaware is only the reform jurisdiction for diffusely held firms. Thus, in
that framework, ex-ante higher quality diffusely held firms will
disproportionately choose Delaware, but this would not be the case for
controlled firms. This would explain part of why βcontrol∙DE is negative, as
well as causal differences.
If the data are telling us that Delaware did not create much extra value
for controlled firms during the study period, then it takes some of the steam
151. See discussion supra Section VI.B.
152. As observed in supra note 20, Nevada has recently substantially weakened the duty
of loyalty in a bid to attract outside incorporators. Nevertheless, I am not aware of any other
state proceeding in this fashion, and legislators and courts do appear to be more cautious in
this area than with respect to various anti-take-over provisions.
153. The direct effect of incorporating at home is only on which state’s corporate law
governs the internal affairs of the company and to increase the likelihood that suits related to
those laws take place in the courts of the home state. But Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler
suggest that incorporating at home may also serve as a useful signal that the company
considers its interests closely tied to its home state, (mildly) increasing its political influence.
See Gilson, Hansmann & Pargendler, supra note 130, at 514. Controlling shareholders seem
likely to have more political influence than management of a diffusely held firm because they
tend to be wealthier and have tighter control over the resources of the firm. Thus, controlled
firms may get more mileage from the signal of incorporating at home.
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out of arguments that MFW and Synutra will decrease firm value as a whole
and that of minority shareholders in particular.154 MFW moved Delaware
law closer to that of other states by cutting down on the extra doctrinal
protection Delaware offered by always using entire fairness review of
conflicted transactions involving the controller.155 A first cut at the data
suggest this extra protection was ultimately not valuable to the minority—
perhaps because it encouraged extra litigation and deterred useful conflicted
transactions. Thus, cutting such extra protection is unlikely to have a
substantial deleterious effect on the value of minority interests or the firm as
a whole.
The view presented above is, I think, a useful contribution on the MFW
question. It is not, however, the only interpretation of the results of this
piece. It is possible Delaware did increase the value of controlled firms
during the study period, and this fact is hidden in the data by differences in
which controlled firms choose Delaware, a possibility I move on to
discussing below.
2. Delaware law is better for controlled firms, leading to bonding
which is more valuable for lower quality firms, and selection
disguises Delaware’s true effect.156
If Delaware law better protects minority shareholders, the regulatory
dualism framework predicts that Delaware will draw ex-ante higher quality
firms whose management is concerned with maximizing share value, rather
than local influence. This is intuitive and seems to be correct in international
contexts when a new strong governance regime is introduced, and all firms
had previously been governed by an older, weak regime. In this case, many
existing controllers have no need to access the equity markets again and are
content to take private benefits and stay in the weak regime. Higher quality
firms by contrast—which are either new, or whose controller wishes to
maximize share price for additional equity issuances—move to the new,
reformed governance regime. The regulatory dualism prediction is not the
only possible view of how controlled firms will sort themselves into
154. See Korsmo, supra note 23 and accompanying text; Cox & Thomas, supra note 23
(discussing various potentially harmful consequences of the M&F Worldwide ruling that
weakened judicial scrutiny of conflicted transactions in controlled firms).
155. Recall that MFW and Synutra instead allow controllers to enjoy the protection of the
business judgment rule if the controller conditions the transaction on approval by an
independent committee and the support of a majority of minority shareholders. Kahn v. M&F
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 642–44 (Del. 2014).
156. See, e.g., Michael C., Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976)
(discussing bonding costs in agency and principal relationships).
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Delaware and home state incorporation, however. This is particularly true
because Delaware did not appear suddenly as a new strong governance
regime. Instead, most controlled firms made an initial choice about whether
to incorporate in Delaware at a time when they needed to access outside
equity markets (i.e., at their IPO).
To see how we could end up with a result not predicted by regulatory
dualism, imagine a simple and extreme world in which there are two types
of controlled firms. The ex-ante high quality firms have controllers (think
Warren Buffett) who already have sparkling reputations and who are bound
by extra-legal strictures like a reputation for honesty sufficiently strong that
the market knows the controller will not take any inefficient private benefits,
regardless of where the firm incorporates. Assume that minority shares in
these ex-ante high quality firms will be worth $2 per share regardless
whether the company incorporates at home or in Delaware. These firms end
up choosing where to incorporate in essence randomly through various
idiosyncratic factors like which lawyers the company hires, with 50% of the
firms ending up at home and 50% in Delaware.157
The second set of firms is ex-ante low quality. In these firms, the
controller has no reputation one way or the other and will likely take some
private benefits wherever the firm incorporates. Assume that if the controller
incorporates at home, she will have more opportunities to extract inefficient
private benefits, and the minority shares will be less valuable, leading to
minority shares worth $1 each. If the firm incorporates in Delaware, the
controller will not be able to take as many inefficient private benefits, and
the minority shares will be worth more, at $1.50 per share. The lower quality
firms, even in Delaware, are worth less than high quality firms because: (1)
Delaware ameliorates, but does not solve, the problems with inefficient
private benefits and (2) controllers without high quality reputations are likely
to be on average worse managers, aside from the question of private benefits.
Potential minority investors in the ex-ante low quality firms will
understand implications of incorporation for the scale of private benefit
extraction and be willing to pay more if the firm is incorporated in Delaware.
If the controller wishes to raise funds in the capital markets, she may find it
advantageous to choose Delaware to maximize the sale price of new equity,
even though she is less able to take private benefits having done so. For
simplicity, assume that all the ex-ante low quality firms choose Delaware for
this reason.
In this world, Delaware creates value for the ex-ante low quality
157. One might also imagine that, as suggested supra in note 153, incorporating at home
is actually optimal for controlled firms where private benefit extraction is not a concern. If
this were true, all the highest quality controlled firms in this model would incorporate at home,
instead of the 50% hypothesized above, exacerbating the selection effect.
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controlled firms, but if we were to estimate a controlled Delaware effect, it
would be negative, because Delaware incorporated controlled firms are
worth less on average. Delaware firms are a mix of ex-ante high quality
firms (minority shares worth $2) and ex-ante low quality firms (minority
shares worth $1.50), whereas the controlled firms incorporated at home are
all ex-ante high quality (minority shares worth $2 per share).
The realism of this model is a different question. There is some support
in the data for a model like this one in which lower quality controlled firms
may choose Delaware, because it seems unlikely that Delaware law actually
causes average controlled firm value to decrease by 4.9%. On the other hand,
in the data, the negative association between Delaware and controlled firm
value is stronger for ex-post more valuable firms at the seventy-fifth
percentile of firm value than for ex post less valuable firms at the twentyfifth percentile.158 The model would seem to suggest the opposite would be
the case. Moreover, the institutional advantages listed in Section IV, like the
reduced uncertainty provided by Delaware’s voluminous case law and
Delaware judges’ expertise in dealing with conflicted transactions would
seem to have real value to higher quality firms as well, making it less likely
selection would dominate in the empirical estimate. Likewise, it seems
probable that many lower quality controlled firms would choose home state
incorporation just because of the randomness embedded in the firm’s choice
of lawyers, particularly because one might think that more talented or
ambitious managers would be more likely to choose national law firms.
Finally, in both this story and the regulatory dualism framework, for
Delaware to serve as a reform jurisdiction or to allow bonding for controlled
firms, there must be mechanisms which penalize the controller for
incorporating in Delaware, reaping the lower cost of capital, and then
reincorporating in the home state.159 Reincorporation expenses may play a
role, but these alone are not sufficient. Reputational costs will also work
better to restrain reincorporation (which is easily observable) than private
benefits extraction (which is not). Still, if the theory discussed in this
subsection is correct, one would also think we would see charter provisions
or other mechanisms designed to empower the minority to reject
reincorporation.

158. See infra Appendix Table A-1; see also Marianne P. Bitler, Jonah B. Gelbach &
Hilary W. Hoynes, What Mean Impacts Miss: Distributional Effects of Welfare Reform
Experiments, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 988 (2006) (explaining how quantile regression can be used
to examine treatment effects which are predicted to be heterogenous based on a model).
159. See Lucian Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to
Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1174 (1999) (discussing the
problems created by reincorporation for viewing Delaware as shareholder wealth
maximizing).
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Overall, while this model of bonding is plausible, more research is
needed to test it.160 Of the two theories just presented, I think this one has
somewhat less support for it. Nevertheless, if the bonding theory is right,
then MFW and Synutra may indeed have destroyed firm value and decreased
the value of minority interests.
3. Delaware law is better for controlled firms, but markets do not price
it.
It is plausible that the market is simply not paying attention to state
fiduciary law, at least prospectively. Anecdotally, I had a job which
frequently required me to read analyst’s reports, and I cannot ever remember
those reports discussing the state law governing the company.161 More
scientifically, Elliott Weiss and Lawrence White found that Delaware firms
did not show abnormal returns in response to seven important decisions,
which made substantial, unanticipated, changes to Delaware corporate
law.162 Weiss and White’s preferred explanation is that investors have
concluded that Delaware decisions essentially lack precedential value. More
likely, the reason Weiss and White do not see stock reactions is because the
decisions impact each firm only a small amount. Market realities suggest
these decisions are unlikely to be priced in the short-term. At funds that
actively trade stocks, analysts and traders typically focus on a firm or
industry. These judicial decisions have only a small impact on any one firm
or industry and thus will garner little attention from these analysts.
Moreover, analysts and traders are generally not well equipped to evaluate
complex and ambiguous legal developments in the short run.163 John Coates
also reports that the question of how minority discounts will be handled by
state law in freeze-outs does not appear to be well understood by market

160. One could partially test the model by examining whether Delaware controlled firms
actually disclose more related party transactions in their SEC filings. If so, this would give
support for the model’s prediction that firms whose controllers may have more opportunity
(or propensity) to take private benefits, choose Delaware as a form of bonding.
Another test would examine a sample of the firms to see whether the controllers in
Delaware corporations look different (e.g., years of experience, more likely to be a
corporation instead of a natural person, etc.) than home-incorporated controlled firms.
161. Admittedly, I did not have to review many reports related to IPOs, prospective
mergers, or takeovers.
162. Elliott J. Weiss & Lawrence J. White, Of Econometrics and Indeterminacy: A Study
of Investors’ Reactions to Changes in Corporate Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 551 (1987).
163. See Merritt B. Fox, The Role of the Market Model in Corporate Law Analysis: A
Comment on Weiss and White, 76 CAL. L. REV. 1015 (1988) (concluding that the reasons a
semi-strong efficient market is predicted to outperform any individual are lacking in this
context).
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participants.164
Nevertheless, this explanation is difficult to accept over the long run. It
is clear that in the international context, markets are well aware of how well
corporate law polices private benefits. This is why control premiums make
up a third or half the value of firms in countries with weak regulation.165
Moreover, markets pay quite a lot of attention to profits, and to the extent
fiduciary law matters, it eventually will show up in profits. Better fiduciary
law discourages harmful self-dealing, which in turn improves the bottom
line, and this will show up in securities prices. So, as a long run explanation,
this is unsatisfying.
4. Control premiums are so small that better fiduciary law simply is
not empirically important.
I have argued that the control premium for U.S. firms is high enough
that we should expect differences in fiduciary law to have a substantial
impact on minority share values. Nevertheless, if Zingales and Nenova’s
work is representative of all controlled firms, then it would be surprising for
differences in state law to have much effect on minority share values.166
While I think there are good reasons to expect that these studies significantly
understate the size of control premiums, it is plausible that they are right, and
thus that the causal impact of Delaware law should be approximately zero
relative to other states.
VIII)

CONCLUSION

This Article traced how state corporate law in general, and Delaware
corporate law in particular, might create value for shareholders in a
controlled firm. Yet the data do not indicate that Delaware creates more
value for minority shareholders than other states. I argued that there is good
reason to believe that my estimate of the Delaware effect would be a ceiling.
But—using the 95% confidence interval—the data rule out that Delaware
adds more than 1.3% to the value of minority shares. This is a surprising
and interesting result that suggests that the market does not greatly value
Delaware’s highly skilled judiciary and extensive case law, at least outside
hostile takeovers. I have suggested a couple of explanations, and further
164. See Coates, supra note 49, at 1309 (“Disclosure regarding minority discounts – even
in jurisdictions in which discounts are or may be legal – is almost nonexistent.”).
165. Dyck & Zingales, supra note 61; Nenova, supra note 62.
166. Likewise, even if control premiums are on the scale I suggest, but are primarily
attributable to efficient private benefits—as in idiosyncratic vision model suggested by
Goshen and Hamdani—better state fiduciary law is again unlikely to be empirically important.
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research is needed to see whether any or all of them explain the pattern seen
in the data.
APPENDIX

